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INTRODUCTION
This Article explores the variety of ways that legal systems, 
especially in the “West” and the Atlantic world, supported slavery 
from the ancient world to the present time. The Article shows how 
slavery helped create modern international law and, at the same time, 
how international law sometimes prevented limitations on slavery. 
We mostly focus on legalized slavery, while acknowledging and 
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briefly discussing various kinds of modern exploitation such as 
human trafficking, which, unlike slavery, has never had legal 
sanction. We end with the realization that after two centuries of 
international condemnation and innumerable laws and treaties to 
suppress human bondage and the trade in slaves “in all its forms,”1
slavery remains and has once again reemerged—in new guises. Like 
Dracula, it has arisen from its legal and political coffin to once again 
haunt our world. 
With the exception of marriage, slavery may be humanity’s 
oldest and most ubiquitous organized social institution.2 Most people 
in our time associate slavery with race, specifically Africans and 
their descendants toiling in New World plantations. But in fact, 
slavery has existed in almost every place and culture in the world.3
Like the mythical vampire, it always seems to be there, ready to 
pounce on the innocent and vulnerable, sucking out their life blood 
for the benefit of their masters and the larger culture. Even when 
abolished and killed off, like the vampire, it rises from the dead to 
reappear in a new guise.
I. THE UNIVERSALITY OF SLAVERY
People of every climate and culture have been masters and 
slaves, without regard to race, religion, or ethnicity. As the 
sociologist Orlando Patterson observed, “There is nothing notably 
peculiar about the institution of slavery. It has existed from before 
the dawn of human history right down to the twentieth century, in the 
most primitive of human societies and in the most civilized.”4
1. See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
(Dec. 10, 1948) (“No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave 
trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.”).
2. See Seymour Drescher & Paul Finkelman, Slavery, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 890-916 (Bardo Fassbender & 
Anne Peters eds., 2012).
3. See, e.g., DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN WESTERN 
CULTURE 3, 29 (1966) (discussing slavery in the ancient world, medieval and early 
modern Europe, and its emergence in the Americas); SEYMOUR DRESCHER,
ABOLITION: A HISTORY OF SLAVERY AND ANTISLAVERY 28 (2009) (detailing an 
expansive history of slavery in the Atlantic world and twentieth century Europe); 
DAVID ELTIS, STANLEY L. ENGERMAN, SEYMOUR DRESCHER & DAVID RICHARDSON,
THE CAMBRIDGE WORLD HISTORY OF SLAVERY (2017); ORLANDO PATTERSON,
SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 1 (1982) (global and 
historical overview of slavery); 2 PAUL FINKELMAN & JOSEPH C. MILLER, THE 
MACMILLAN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD SLAVERY 461-63 (1998).
4. See PATTERSON, supra note 3, at vii.
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Patterson found slavery in every “region on earth” and concluded 
that “probably there is no group of people whose ancestors were not 
at one time slaves or slaveholders.”5 Although we find slavery in all 
cultures and locations, this Article will mostly focus on the traditions 
of slavery and international law in western society, including the 
ancient near east, the Mediterranean basin, Europe, and the 
Americas, especially the United States and the British Caribbean. 
Slavery on a mass scale did not emerge until the evolution of 
agriculture in the Neolithic period provided enough food to justify 
acquiring extra workers, or at least being able to feed them.6 But, 
before the Neolithic period, some people were clearly owned by 
others, and leaders of communities were likely to be slaveowners. 
Archaeological evidence suggests that people were held as slaves in 
some prehistoric and most ancient societies. Graves reveal that 
slaves were sometimes killed and buried with important leaders to 
serve them in the afterlife.7
Furthermore, slavery has always been important beyond any 
economic surplus value it produced. Slaves have been used for 
personal service, degrading labor, and in almost all societies, as 
objects of sexual pleasure and gratification.8 In many societies slave 
women were used as surrogate mothers to increase the number of 
children of the master or even to provide him with children if his 
wife was unable to have children.9
5. See id.
6. See DAVID BRION DAVIS, INHUMAN BONDAGE: THE RISE AND FALL OF 
SLAVERY IN THE NEW WORLD 32, 37 (2006).
7. See PATTERSON, supra note 3, at 239. For this practice beyond the 
ancient world, see Tia Ghose, Viking Graves Yield Grisly Find: Sacrificed Slaves,
LIVE SCI. (Oct. 30, 2013, 7:28 AM), http://www.livescience.com/40792-viking-
slaves-sacrified-burial.html [https://perma.cc/JPP7-AEHA].
8. See generally SEX, POWER, AND SLAVERY 31-32 (Gwyn Campbell &
Elizabeth Elbourne eds., 2014).
9. Under Islamic law, for example, the child of a slave woman and her 
master is a free person and the legitimate child of the father. Thus, Islamic masters 
might use slave women to increase the number of their heirs and children. Bernard 
K. Freamon, Slavery, Freedom, and the Doctrine of Consensus in Islamic 
Jurisprudence, 11 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 51-52 (1998). In the Biblical story of 
Abraham, he has a child, Ishmael, with his slave Hagar when his wife, Sarah, cannot 
bear a child. In this story Hagar takes on the role of surrogate mother. Genesis 16:1-
5; 21:18-13 (JPS Tanakh 1985). He also has children with another slave woman, 
Keturah, and they were also treated as his legitimate children. Id. at 25:1-5. Later in 
Genesis, Jacob has children with his two wives, Leah and Rebecca, and two slave 
women, Bilhah and Zilpah. Id. at 30:3-12. The sons of all four women are his heirs.
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Throughout human history, slavery symbolized the power of 
the master through the subjugation of the slave. Thus, slavery has 
often been found in cultures where the economic value of slaves was 
minimal but where there were strong cultural reasons for 
enslavement. The Tupinambá, in pre-Columbian Brazil, held slaves 
for ritual purposes, eventually killing and eating them. As David 
Brion Davis notes, this ritual ownership of slaves was not merely (or 
even) economically important; rather, it was tied to concepts of 
honor, power, prestige, and even political relations with neighboring 
peoples.10 All of these factors explain how slavery began and why it 
continues, in ever-changing circumstances, to bedevil the success of 
“the better angels of our nature” in obliterating it.11
From the earliest period of human history until the mid-
eighteenth century, there were few protests against slavery as a
system and still less any collective opposition to it. As Joseph C. 
Miller recently observed, “the modern critical study of abolition of 
the Atlantic trade and emancipation of the enslaved as an intellectual 
application of modern humanism”12 began with David Brion Davis’s 
pathbreaking The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture,13 in which 
“[h]e wondered why the same philosophical and religious traditions 
that had tolerated slavery in Europe for two millennia suddenly 
became sources of massive public opposition to the practice in 
eighteenth-century England, to a lesser degree in France, and 
belatedly also in the United States.”14
Before the eighteenth century there were some protests against 
specific kinds of slavery, such as Islamic and Catholic opposition to 
the enslavement of co-religionists, or some Catholic opposition to 
the enslavement of Indians. Bishop Bartolomé de las Casas 
(1474(?)–1566) famously condemned the enslavement of American 
Indians and had some success in persuading the Spanish Crown to 
limit the practice.15 But Spain immediately substituted African slaves 
for Indians with devastating consequences. Las Casas eventually 
publicly condemned the enslavement of Africans and implicitly all 
10. See DAVIS, supra note 6, at 28-29.
11. See Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address—Final Text, in 4 THE 
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 262, 263, 271 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
12. See Joseph C. Miller, Introduction: Atlantic Ambiguities of British and 
American Abolition, 66 WM. & MARY Q. 680 (2009).
13. See generally DAVIS, supra note 3. 
14. See Miller, supra note 12, at 680.
15. See LEWIS HANKE, ARISTOTLE AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS: A STUDY IN 
RACE PREJUDICE IN THE MODERN WORLD 18-19, 28-37 (1959).
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slavery. But, his condemnations had no impact on Spanish policy.16
The next—and somewhat more successful—attacks on slavery 
would come in the late seventeenth century in America, with the 
Germantown, Pennsylvania protest against slavery (1688) and 
Samuel Sewall’s The Selling of Joseph: A Memorial, published in 
Massachusetts in 1700. Only in the mid-eighteenth century would 
Quakers and other pietists, Methodists, some Baptists, and some 
political activists, lawyers, and enlightenment thinkers begin a 
concerted attack on slavery per se. 
Some early modern clerics, and even a few Popes, argued that 
slavery was contrary to natural law. In 1462, Pope Pius II declared 
slavery to be “a great crime” (“Magnum scelus”) but only applied 
this conclusion to “wicked Christians who were taking the recently 
baptized adult converts into slavery.”17 It did not prevent the 
enslavement of nonbaptized Indians or Africans. There were periodic 
individual condemnations of various aspects of the slave trade and 
slavery as it developed in the Atlantic world. A number of Catholic 
clerics attempted to appeal to royal or papal authority to condemn the 
transatlantic slave trade as it developed between the fifteenth and 
eighteenth centuries. In no case, however, was there a large-scale or 
continuous collective effort to bring the system to an end. These
protests also had absolutely no effect on slavery on the Catholic 
northern rim of the Mediterranean, Iberia, or within the Church itself. 
The Vatican would continue to hold slaves until the end of the 
eighteenth century. Within three decades after Pius II’s declaration, 
16. The earliest known significant protest against slavery was by Bishop 
Bartolomé de las Casas, who argued against enslaving Carib Indians in the early 
sixteenth century, on the grounds that their continued enslavement would lead to 
their total annihilation, which was contrary to God’s law. Las Casas in effect 
invented (or at least observed) the concept of genocide and urged the Spanish crown 
to prevent it. This was not a full-blown attack on slavery per se. Ironically, he 
suggested that Spain substitute African slaves for Indians. Spain was already in the 
process of this transition, and Las Casas’s suggestion probably had no effect on the 
growth of African slavery in Spain’s New World empire. Only later did Las Casas 
oppose all slavery in the Spanish Empire. He was probably the first modern thinker 
to reach this position. See DAVIS, supra note 3, at 169-83; HANKE, supra note 15, at
3-4, 9.
17. See JOHN FRANCIS MAXWELL, SLAVERY AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH:
THE HISTORY OF CATHOLIC TEACHING CONCERNING THE MORAL LEGITIMACY OF THE 
INSTITUTION OF SLAVERY 51-52 (1975); Slavery and Christianity, THE CATHOLIC 
ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/14036a.htm [https://perma.cc/
3TCW-834J] (last visited Jan. 22, 2018). For a comprehensive analysis of the limits 
and limitations of antislavery from antiquity to the late eighteenth century, see 
generally OLIVIER GRENOUILLEAU, LA RÉVOLUTION ABOLITIONNISTE 9-81 (2016).
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Spain and Portugal would begin their 400-year rapacious 
enslavement of millions of American Indians and Africans, only to 
be joined a century later by their French Catholic neighbors. This 
process began with the full blessing and support of the Church. In 
1452 Pope Nicholas V gave the Portuguese “full and free permission 
to invade, search out, capture and subjugate the Saracens and pagans 
and any other unbelievers and enemies of Christ wherever they may 
be, as well as their . . . duchies, countries, principalities, and other 
property . . . and to reduce their persons into perpetual slavery.”18 In 
addition to New World Indians, sub-Saharan Africans fit into these 
categories whether they were pagans or Muslims. Two years later, 
Pope Nicholas acknowledged the legitimacy of holding Africans as 
slaves in the Canary Islands and in “all territories that might 
henceforth be acquired” by Portugal.19 Pope Calixtus III, Pope Sixtus
IV, and Pope Leo X “confirmed these grants” allowing Portugal to 
enslave Africans.20
In the wake of Columbus’s first voyage to America, Pope 
Alexander VI authorized King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella—“Los 
Reyes Católicos” as the Spanish still call them—to enslave Africans 
and Indians in the New World.21 Both Spain and Portugal now had 
“full and free permission” from the Vatican to enslave the 
inhabitants of the “Saracen and pagan” lands they conquered.22 The 
Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494 confirmed all of this. International law, 
or the law of the nations as it was called at the time, literally 
“blessed” by the Pope, now supported the enslavement of Africans 
and Indians and set the stage for the great Atlantic slave trade. In 
1506, Pope Julius II confirmed the terms of the Treaty. These Papal 
decrees led to various edicts by the Spanish crown authorizing the 
enslavement of the Carib Indians.23
In the sixteenth century, there would be a few specific 
condemnations of some forms of slavery and some assertions that 
slavery was wrong, but they were half-hearted at best. Most were 
narrowly focused on the enslavement of the newly discovered people 
18. See DRESCHER, supra note 3, at 62-63; MAXWELL supra note 17, at 53-
54.
19. DRESCHER, supra note 3, at 62.
20. See id. at 62-63; MAXWELL supra note 17, at 53-54.
21. See DRESCHER, supra note 3, at 62 (explaining Pope Alexander’s 
authorization for King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella to enslave Africans and 
Indians).
22. Id.
23. See id. at 62-63; MAXWELL, supra note 17, at 55-62.
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in the New World rather than against slavery per se, or were so 
general in nature that they seemed to apply to no specific practices. 
In 1537 Pope Paul III “declared that the sacraments should be 
withheld” from Spanish colonists who enslaved Indians by depriving 
them of their “natural liberty,” but a year later, Pope Paul revoked 
the penalties,24 which meant that Catholics in America would not be 
deprived of the sacraments of the faith, even if they held Indians as 
slaves. Meanwhile, the Congregation for the Supreme and Universal 
Inquisition, created by Pope Paul III in 1542, explicitly allowed the 
Knights of Malta to enslave captives who had converted to Islam, 
even if after their capture they reconciled with the Church. 
Meanwhile, the Spanish philosopher Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda 
argued that the conquest and enslavement of Indians in America was 
justified and legitimate.25
In the first half of the sixteenth century, the Spanish cleric and 
legal philosopher Francisco de Vitoria (1452–1546) expressed 
reservations about the enslavement of American Indians because 
their enslavement did not emanate from a “just war.” But Vitoria 
never condemned all slavery on the basis of natural law and 
approved the enslavement of captives captured in a just war. This 
would easily include slaves bought in Africa who had presumably 
been reduced to slavery in a just war or by some other “legal” means 
before they were sold to Europeans. Most importantly, in the end, 
Vitoria acquiesced to the practical reality of slavery in Spain’s 
emerging New World empire. The Jesuit Francisco Suarez (1548–
1617) offered a theoretical condemnation of slavery, but as David 
Brion Davis noted, Suarez “accepted a sharp dualism between the 
eternal law of nature and a law of nations governed by expediency 
and conditioned by circumstance. Slavery, like private property, 
could not be justified by the highest moral law; yet its expediency
had been revealed by the almost universal practice of nations.”26
Thus, for Suarez, “it was unnecessary that an institution sanctioned 
by utility and common practice be shown as conformable to the 
absolute ideal of nature.”27 With a few exceptions,28 these objections 
to slavery were mostly theoretical and not attacks on the actual 
24. See DAVIS, supra note 3, at, 170.
25. See HANKE, supra note 15, at 33.
26. See DAVIS, supra note 3, at 109.
27. See id.
28. In addition to Bishop de las Casas, his colleague Fray (Friar) Domingo 
de Soto “doubted whether there was any justice in Negro slavery.” DAVIS, supra 
note 3, at 187. However, nothing came of his views.
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practice of slavery. Significantly, while the Church eventually 
condemned the enslavement of some Indians in America, “not one” 
of the Papal decrees from the 1400s to the early nineteenth century 
“makes any reference to the enslavement of the Negroes in West 
Africa nor to the transatlantic trade in Negro slaves.”29
Thus, before the late eighteenth century slavery was still 
regarded as normal, even natural. Slavery was ubiquitous in all 
ancient cultures. In some, like Greece and Rome, slaves were so 
significant a portion of the population that they were essentially 
“slave societies.”30 The leading philosophers, legal commentators, 
and intellectuals of ancient Greece and Rome all accepted both the 
existence and the necessity of slavery. The three major western 
religious traditions—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—all accepted 
slavery and wove it into their legal codes. Christians may have 
professed to want to “do unto others, as you would have them do 
unto you,”31 but that did not stop churches from owning slaves in 
their corporate capacity, or priests, ministers, or pastors from buying 
and selling human beings and justifying slavery in their sermons. 
In the fourth century C.E., the Synod of Gangra expressed 
concern that “slaves [were] also leaving their masters, and, on 
account of their own strange apparel, acting insolently towards their 
masters.”32 To counter this problem the Synod declared an anathema 
on anyone who “shall teach a slave, under pretext of piety, to despise 
his master and to run away from his service, and not to serve his own 
master with good-will and all honour.”33 Early Canon Law allowed 
the imposition of slavery for various offenses, even when the 
“offender” was not the guilty party. In 655, the Ninth Council of 
Toledo mandated the enslavement of the children of priests, even 
though the fathers, and not the children, had been guilty of violating 
clerical vows of celibacy. The Council of Pavia reaffirmed this rule 
in 1012. While married men could not sell their wives into slavery, 
29. See MAXWELL, supra note 17, at 73.
30. See MOSES I. FINLEY, ANCIENT SLAVERY AND MODERN IDEOLOGY 9
(1980). Moses Finley, the great historian of the ancient world and slavery, identifies
five historical cultures—classical Greece, ancient Rome, Brazil, the Caribbean, and 
the United States South—as “slave societies.” Id.
31. See Luke 6:31 (New Revised Standard Edition) (“Do to others as you 
would have them do to you”); Matthew 7:12 (New Revised Standard Edition) (“In 
everything do to others as you would have them do to you; for this is the law and the 
prophets.”).
32. Synod of Gangra, NEW ADVENT, http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/
3804.htm [https://perma.cc/2DGM-TYAE] (last visited Jan. 22, 2018).
33. Id.
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the Church could effectively do it in some circumstances. Thus, in 
1089 Pope Urban II “enforced clerical celibacy by granting to 
secular princes the power to reduce the wives of clerics to slavery.”34
These rules on enslaving the children and wives of clerics were later 
“incorporated into the Western Church’s collection of canons.”35 The 
acceptance of slavery by Christians continued virtually unabated for 
another eight centuries. With a few exceptions, neither the 
Renaissance nor the Reformation undermined slavery in the 
Christian world. 
Islamic religious law, VKDUƯ’a, sanctioned slavery, especially 
when applied to unbelievers. Until the mid-nineteenth century there 
was no Islamic society “without slaves,” and in the modern world, 
Muslim states would be the last to formally prohibit slavery.36 While 
there are antislavery implications in some Islamic texts, by 800 C.E. 
various religious leaders accepted that slavery could be based on 
capture or circumstances of birth, and other justifications came later.
Although “Islam, as a system of belief, meaning and law[,] sought 
from its inception to mitigate enslavement and limit its scope,”37
there was never any condemnation or prohibition of slavery, and the 
“practice and custom prevailed in most societies where Islam 
dominated the social order.”38 Meanwhile, “[c]onverting to Islam 
after enslavement was no passport to liberty.”39 This last point 
dovetailed perfectly with medieval Europe, where non-Christian 
slaves were baptized but not freed.40 In early Virginia this practice 
was codified with “[a]n act declaring that baptisme of slaves doth not 
exempt them from bondage.”41 After that, settlers in the British 
34. MAXWELL, supra note 17, at 37; Gil Brodie, Timeline,
http://www.kingscollege.net/gbrodie/Timeline%201012%20-
%20Council%20of%20Pavia.html [https://perma.cc/M2W5-6P8G] (last visited Jan. 
22, 2018).
35. MAXWELL, supra note 17, at 37; Brodie, supra note 34.
36. See DRESCHER, supra note 3, at 18. See also WILLIAM GERVASE 
CLARENCE-SMITH, ISLAM AND ABOLITION OF SLAVERY 1 (2006); Bernard Freamon, 
Definitions and Conceptions of Slave Ownerships in Islamic Law, in THE LEGAL 
UNDERSTANDING OF SLAVERY: FROM THE HISTORICAL TO THE CONTEMPORARY 40-60
(Jean Allain ed., 2012).
37. Ehud R. Toledano, Enslavement and Abolition in Muslim Societies, 48 
J. AFRICAN HIST. 481, 484 (2007).
38. Id.
39. CLARENCE-SMITH, supra note 36, at 22.
40. WILLIAM D. PHILLIPS, JR., SLAVERY FROM ROMAN TIMES TO THE EARLY 
TRANSATLANTIC TRADE 101 (1985).
41. Law of Sept. 23, 1667, Act III Va. Laws 260 (repealed) (“WHEREAS 
some doubts have arisin whether children that are slaves by birth, and by the charity 
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colonies and later the American states, just like the settlers in the 
Iberian and French colonies, regularly baptized their slaves, in part 
because formal religions functioned as a useful tool in controlling 
slaves. 
English and Anglo-American Protestants had little problem 
defending slavery, even as they baptized their human property. In the 
mid-eighteenth century, Rev. George Whitefield, the most famous 
Anglican preacher of the Great Awakening, not only found scriptural 
support for slavery, but bought a plantation in Georgia with about 
seventy-five slaves on it. More than a century later, the essay “The 
Duties of Christian Masters,” won a prize from the Alabama Baptist 
Convention.42
However, even as slavery emerged in the New World, there 
was a major development in juridical attitudes toward slavery within 
some Northwestern European nations by the time they joined the 
Spanish and Portuguese in the colonization of the New World. Their 
juridical systems had embraced the principle (although not always 
the practice) that their realms had become “free soil” zones. Natives 
or persons crossing their borders could not be enslaved or treated as 
slaves. This was to become a crucial distinction in the development 
of modern antislavery.43 This emerging “freedom principle” did not 
apply in the New World. Thus, most French, Dutch, and English 
systems accepted the premise that “Beyond the Line,” that is beyond 
the jurisdiction of their home countries, this 
metropolitan exception did not apply. Most English and Anglo-
American Protestant settlers from Massachusetts to the Caribbean 
adjusted to the norm. Most had little problem defending it or 
accepting it. 
and piety of their owners made pertakers of the blessed sacrament of baptisme, 
should by virtue of their baptisme be made ffree; It is enacted . . . that the conferring 
of baptisme doth not alter the condition of the person as to his bondage or 
ffreedome; that diverse masters, ffreed from this doubt, may more carefully 
endeavour the propagation of christianity by permitting . . . slaves . . . to be admitted 
to that sacrament.”).
42. See DAVIS, supra note 3, at 148; Rev. A. T. Holmes, The Duties of 
Christian Masters, in PAUL FINKELMAN, DEFENDING SLAVERY: PROSLAVERY 
THOUGHT IN THE OLD SOUTH: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 107 (2003). For 
early abolitionist challenges to the norm, see DAVIS, supra note 3, at 165-96, 291-
332. See GRENOUILLLEAU, supra note 17, at ch. 2; John Donoghue, Out of the Land 
of Bondage: The English Revolution and Atlantic Origins of Abolition, 115 AM. HIS.
REV. 943 (2010).
43. DRESCHER, supra note 3, at 20-25; DAVID ELTIS, THE RISE OF AFRICAN 
SLAVERY IN THE AMERICAS 1-28 (2000).
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Starting in the late eighteenth century, states and nations began 
to legally abolish the institution. Since then there have been more 
than 100 treaties to end the slave trade. The Congress of Vienna in 
1815 declared “that the commerce, known by the name of ‘the Slave 
Trade,’ has been considered by just and enlightened men of all ages, 
as repugnant to the principles of humanity and universal morality.”44
The delegates declared that they could not 
do greater credit to their mission, better fulfil their duty, and manifest the 
principles which actuate their august Sovereigns, than by endeavouring to 
carry this engagement into effect, and by proclaiming, in the name of their 
Sovereigns, their wish of putting an end to a scourge, which has so long 
desolated Africa, degraded Europe, and afflicted humanity.45
But in the end, all the Congress of Vienna could do was 
recommend that European states end the trade. In the next seven 
decades individual nations would end the trade and Britain would 
sign numerous bilateral treaties to end the trade. But, there would be 
no further collective international action until conferences in Berlin 
and Brussels at the end of the nineteenth century in part focused on 
ending slavery worldwide. 
The Berlin Conference of 1884 on Africa condemned the slave 
trade; the Berlin Act signed the following year declared that slave 
trading was “forbidden in conformity with the principles of 
international law,” although the Act provided no enforcement 
mechanisms.46 “The Brussels Act of 1890 was the first 
comprehensive multilateral treaty directed specifically against the 
African slave trade.”47 The League of Nations pushed hard to end it 
in the 1920s.48 But slavery reemerged in the 1930s in the Soviet 
Gulag, the German Third Reich, and the Japanese empire. From 
1939 to 1945, some 12 million foreigners would be transported to 
Germany, many as forced laborers. In addition, millions of Eastern 
Europeans, especially Jews, Roma, and captured Soviet prisoners of 
44. Preliminary Treaty of Alliance, Great Britain-Austria, Act. No. XV, 
June 9, 1815.
45. Id.
46. General Act of the Berlin Conference on West Africa, Art. 9, Feb. 26, 
1885.
47. Seymour Drescher, From Consensus to Consensus: Slavery in 
International Law, in THE LEGAL UNDERSTANDING OF SLAVERY: FROM THE 
HISTORICAL TO THE CONTEMPORARY 85, 98 (Jean Allain ed., 2012).
48. Id. at 98-99; see Drescher & Finkelman, supra note 2, at 907-13; Renee
C. Redman, Brussels Act (1890), in 1 PAUL FINKELMAN & JOSEPH C. MILLER,
MACMILLAN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD SLAVERY 132 (1998).
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war, would be used as slave labor both outside and inside Germany, 
often in inhuman, barbaric conditions where they were literally 
worked to death. Enslavement was one of the crimes against 
humanity for which Nazi leaders were prosecuted and hanged at 
Nuremberg. After the War, the United Nations forcefully condemned 
slavery in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and 
subsequent documents. By 2013, every nation on earth had formally 
prohibited slavery, and numerous international agreements and 
treaties had also forbidden it.49
II. THE PROBLEM OF DEFINING SLAVERY
Before turning to the relationship between slavery and 
international law, it is necessary to try to define both slaves and 
slavery, especially in the legal context. This is not as simple as it 
might seem. One issue is the difference between a “slave” and 
“slavery.” Although modern legal doctrine and international law 
prohibit both slavery and slave-like conditions, there is an important 
difference between treating someone as a slave and having a system 
of slavery. The first can happen outside the law and in violation of 
the law. But, such treatment does not create a system of slavery 
unless there is explicit or de facto acceptance of these conditions by 
the formal legal and political structures, or significant acceptance of 
such conditions by the general population. Thus, it is possible to 
have “slaves” without a system of slavery. 
Most people in the modern world have a mental image of 
slavery, based in part on popular media. Slaves are imagined as 
Africans or their New World descendants, crammed into slave ships 
in the middle passage or laboring in the U.S. South, the Caribbean, 
or Brazil, depicted in movies like Roots, Amistad, Twelve Years a 
Slave, or Glory; they are Hebrews, building cities for Ramses in the 
iconic movie The Ten Commandments; they are Romans fighting for 
their lives as gladiators, or galley slaves, chained in the bottom of 
Roman ships in Ben Hur, or they are recaptured slaves dying horrible 
deaths after the failed rebellion of Spartacus. Most of these images 
49. See Reuters, Mauritania, Country with Most Slaves Per Capita, Must 
End Brutal Practice: UN, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 31, 2013, 2:13 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/31/mauritania-slavery-un_n_4182422.html
[https://perma.cc/Q2TB-62GQ]; John D. Sutter, Report: Mauritania Is No Longer
the World’s Slavery Capital, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2016/05/30/opinions/sutter-
slavery-index-mauritania/ [https://perma.cc/J655-9VXK] (last updated June 1, 
2016).
The Eternal Problem of Slavery 767
have some basis in history, filtered of course through the 
entrepreneurial lens of Hollywood cameras and producers.
For others, “slavery” has recently become expanded to apply to 
an increasingly wide range of human exploitation. Thus, the 
contemporary phenomenon of human trafficking is often referred to 
as “modern slavery,” especially by activists who are striving to raise 
awareness of the issue, recruit volunteers, gain political support, and 
solicit donations, grants, and other financial support for their cause. 
Agricultural or industrial laborers, people caught up in the sex 
industry, and child care workers in many countries are labeled slaves 
in this modern lexicon. Many scholars find the application of 
“slavery” to such conditions too imprecise and fluid. Slavery has 
always been associated with the legal ownership of people as distinct 
from the exploitation of their labor. As such, slavery is almost 
always supported by laws, governments, and widely accepted social 
practice. The criminal exploitation of people does not create a system 
of slavery, although it may lead to slave-like conditions for the 
people caught up in the webs of criminal enterprises and activities. 
Similarly problematic is the idea proclaimed by some modern 
activists that slavery is about “disposable people.”50 This term may 
be overly broad since historically, and even in the modern age, many 
(perhaps most) slaves were not “disposable,” but were seen as 
valuable assets to be retained, sold, or inherited. In the ancient world, 
for example, when captured soldiers were enslaved they were not 
“disposed,” but rather kept alive precisely because they were 
valuable. On the other hand, Jews or Roma sent to death camps were 
usually quickly “disposed,”—that is, murdered. Those not 
exterminated were kept alive as slaves as long as they had value, but 
they were still disposable, in part because the German government 
was able to so easily replace them.
In the modern world, especially in western countries, many 
undocumented aliens are exploited, mistreated, and often held 
against their will by force or fear. But they are not permanently held 
as slaves or generally sold, gifted, or mortgaged as property. 
Eventually most escape or are released from the illegal conditions 
under which they are held. Slaves are held for life, their children 
usually inherit their status, and their bondage is supported by the 
state, the police, and the culture.
50. See generally KEVIN BALES, DISPOSABLE PEOPLE: NEW SLAVERY IN THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMY (2012).
768 Michigan State Law Review 2017
Orlando Patterson defines slaves as people who are natally 
alienated—cut off from their communities or kin or the nations and 
places of their birth, and denied admission on the basis of equality in 
their new places of residence.51 Thus, they have suffered “social 
death.”52 This idea of isolation helps explain what happens to people 
who are kidnapped or captured and turned into slaves—such as 
people kidnapped in Africa and shipped to the New World as part of 
the Atlantic slave trade—but this concept is less compelling for 
people born into slavery and raised in slave communities. Moreover, 
there are many others in the world who have been natally alienated 
but were not slaves. The historian David Brion Davis talks of a 
“spectrum of states of freedom and dependency or powerlessness, 
with various types of serfdom and peonage shading off into actual 
slavery.”53 He also stresses the dehumanizing aspects of slavery and 
the vulnerability of slaves. “The absence of a past and a future, of a 
place in history and society from which to grow in small increments, 
made each slave totally vulnerable. This may be the essence of 
dehumanization.”54 Both these descriptions are helpful but 
problematic. Throughout history, people who were clearly not slaves 
have been natally alienated. Young teenagers (who were really still 
children) might be drafted into the Russian Army for a quarter 
century of service and never return to their families;55 orphans who 
became wards or servants of a political or religious authority, 
immigrants, and refugees may lose their whole families and cultures; 
Native American children were alienated by spending years at 
residential schools in Canada and the United States, with some 
punished for merely speaking their own language. But, none of these 
natally alienated people were legally slaves, and many might 
eventually see their status and circumstances altered. Similarly, 
people have been vulnerable and subject to arbitrary dehumanization 
in industrial settings, in the military, or by their own abusive parents, 
but they were not slaves. 
Slavery lacks a clear and concise definition, and the substance 
and experiences of slavery have varied from place to place and over 
51. PATTERSON, supra note 3, at 7. Patterson says natal alienation is “the 
loss of ties of birth in both ascending and descending generations.” Id.
52. Id. at 38.
53. DAVIS, supra note 6, at 36.
54. Id. at 36-37.
55. DEREK J. PENSLAR, JEWS AND THE MILITARY: A HISTORY 28-30 (2013).
Penslar argues that this was not as common as many people believe but nevertheless 
was the fate of many Russian-Jewish youth, especially those from poor families.
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time. But as we have argued elsewhere,56 systems of slavery include 
most, or all, of the following conditions: 
(1) People are held as slaves for life and are legally considered to be 
property, and so they are owned by others and can be sold, traded, rented, 
given away, bequeathed and inherited, and exchanged for other slaves or 
things of value; where state slavery exists (such as Nazi Germany), they 
are acquired by the government, and even if there is no process for the 
government to sell them, the government can assign or rent state owned 
slaves to private actors;57
(2) the status of “slave” is inheritable, usually (although not always) 
through the mother; Romans considered this rule—that the child follows 
the status of the mother—”as being of the law of nations.”58 Thus while 
historically many free people—or people who had recognized standing 
within their home communities—were captured and enslaved by their 
captors from other societies, in many places, such as the later Roman 
Empire59 or the antebellum U.S. South, the majority of slaves were born 
into that status; 
(3) formal legal structures or customs that have the virtual force of law 
regulate the return of fugitive slaves who escape the immediate control of 
their owners; in this process the government sanctions the use of private 
force and violence to recover fugitive slaves, but the government may also 
choose to use its own forces to recover fugitives; in addition, the
government may punish people who protect or harbor fugitives and allow 
private lawsuits by aggrieved slave owners against those who aided their 
runaway slaves; 
(4) slaves have limited (or no) legal rights or protections; they can 
generally neither sue nor be sued; when prosecuted for crimes they have 
very few rights or protections; those “rights” they have are usually created 
to either protect the master’s property interest in the slave or to preserve 
the integrity of the legal system itself and not to protect the personal or 
individual rights of the slaves; 
(5) slaves may be punished by slaveowners (or their agents) with minimal 
or no interference from the government or formal legal institutions; 
masters may punish slaves for any reason, or no reason at all; it is 
generally illegal for slaves to resist punishment or fight back; the state also 
maintains the right to punish slaves for crimes or violations of rules 
formally enacted by the state; 
(6) masters may treat, or mistreat, slaves as they wish, although some 
societies required that masters treat slaves “humanely,” or banned some 
56. This is an expansion of a list in Drescher & Finkelman, supra note 2, at 
890-91. The original list is used in the legal definition of slavery in BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY. Slavery, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
57. For example, the S.S. rented workers from Auschwitz at a fixed daily 
rate to I.G. Farben and other industries. See DRESCHER, supra note 3, at 441-42.
58. ALAN WATSON, ROMAN SLAVE LAW 10 (1987).
59. See id. at 8, 12.
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extreme or barbaric forms of punishment and torture; and some (like the 
antebellum Southern states) prohibited murdering slaves, even as they 
defined that term to be quite different from murdering free people; in 
others, like Rome, masters could kill slaves without legal constraints, and 
strangers who did so were only subject to penalties for destroying 
someone else’s property; 
(7) masters have unlimited rights to sexual activity with their slaves; 
slaves have no right to resist the sexual advances of their masters; 
(8) slaves have no rights or very limited rights to appeal the actions of 
their masters to formal legal institutions; 
(9) slaves have only a limited voice in legal proceedings and are not 
allowed to give testimony against their masters or (usually) other free 
people; where their testimony is permitted, courts will generally not give it 
the same weight as if coming from a free person; 
(10) the mobility of slaves is limited by owners and often by the state as 
well; 
(11) slavery is a lifelong (and inheritable) status; however, owners are able 
to make slaves into free persons through a formal legal process 
(manumission), but often these freedpersons may not be given full legal 
rights; the state almost always retains the right to limit, reverse, or 
completely forbid manumission; and
(12) the ownership of slaves is supported, usually explicitly, by laws, 
regulations, administrative activities, courts, and legislatures, including 
provisions for special courts and special punishments for slaves, 
provisions for the capture and return of fugitive slaves, and provisions and 
rules for regulating the sale of slaves. 
All of these aspects of slavery have been part of the development of 
the international law regulating slavery. 
III. THE LAW OF SLAVERY IN THE ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL 
WORLDS: INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDINGS BEFORE THERE WAS 
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Some of the earliest existing written records of the ancient 
world discuss slaves. But there is also extensive evidence of slave-
holding in nonwritten archaeological sources. Slavery was one of the 
first universally accepted statuses of human relationships to be 
justified in a code of laws. Most ancient legal codes and records—
Mesopotamian, Assyrian, Babylonian, Biblical, Greek, and Roman—
acknowledged and regulated slavery. The Ur-Nammu Code from 
about 2100 B.C.E., the code of Eshnunna from about 1770 B.C.E., 
the Code of Hammurabi from 1752 B.C.E., and the Hittite Code 
from 1500 B.C.E. all regulated slavery. The Book of Deuteronomy, 
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with its laws regulating slavery, is widely associated with King 
Josiah of Jerusalem from about 621 B.C.E. Greek codes on slavery 
date from sometime in the mid-500s B.C.E. A Mesopotamian legal 
record from 2030 B.C.E. contains an unsuccessful appeal for 
freedom from twelve slaves. This is the oldest known freedom suit in 
world history. Contract disputes over slaves date from 500 B.C.E., as 
do records of manumission—masters voluntarily freeing their 
slaves.60 Legal records involving claims of freedom, sales of slaves, 
or the punishment of slaves are found throughout the artifacts and 
other records of the ancient world. Only in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries—after nearly four millennia of known human 
history—did slavery as an institution come under sustained juridical 
and political attack. 
Slavery was the backbone of the Roman Empire, and vigorous 
systems of slavery existed in parts of Europe well after the fall of 
Rome. From late antiquity to the end of the medieval period, Vikings 
brought slaves from the Baltic region, including what is today 
Poland, Russia, and Ukraine (they also brought slaves from Ireland 
and Scotland) to the northern shores of the Mediterranean. The word 
“slave,” which emerged in the twelfth century, reflected the ethnic 
origins of slaves arriving in southern Europe: The Slavs whom the 
Vikings brought were slaves, and the words “slave” and “Slav” 
became almost interchangeable. The word slave appeared in the 
English language in the thirteenth century, emerging from Old 
French, medieval Latin, and from the simultaneous Viking slave 
trade.61 By the mid-fifteenth century, on the eve of the European 
expansion into the America, slaves were found on both sides of the 
Mediterranean. 
Throughout the Ancient World and into the modern period, 
legal systems and international law (or the Law of Nations as it was 
called at the time) recognized slavery. The status of “slave” could be 
created by local law, but that status was then almost universally 
recognized beyond the locality where the enslavement happened. 
People were born into slavery, sentenced to slavery because of a 
criminal act, or reduced to slavery (or sometimes self-enslavement) 
60. See id. at 23.
61. The OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY dates the first English use of the 
term in 1290. See Slave, n.1, THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY,
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/181477?result=1&rskey=k1ai8N& (last visited Jan. 
22, 2018). Before this, the word for slaves—“servus”—was taken from the Roman 
Civil Code. Neither the Scandinavian languages nor the Slavic languages use “slav”
as a root word for slavery. 
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by economic or other circumstances. Insolvents might cover their 
debts by selling their children into slavery or find themselves 
condemned to bondage because of their debts.62 In some cultures, 
there is evidence of husbands selling their wives into slavery. China 
and Vietnam prohibited selling wives into slavery.63 The formal 
promulgation of such a law strongly suggests that this was a common 
practice. The accepted law of war, until at least the 1500s, was that 
soldiers captured in battle could be summarily executed, and thus 
enslavement of prisoners offered a legitimate and legally recognized 
“humane” alternative to instant death. As late as 1370, Pope Clement 
declared that captured Venetian soldiers would be sold as slaves.64
Captured civilians were also legitimately enslaved throughout the 
ancient world and into the medieval period.65 Once enslaved, other 
jurisdictions rarely, if ever, questioned that status or the origin of that 
62. See DAVIS, supra note 6, at 40; PATTERSON, supra note 3, at 23-24
(describing selling children and concubines into slavery); see also W.W. BUCKLAND,
THE ROMAN LAW OF SLAVERY: THE CONDITION OF THE SLAVE IN PRIVATE LAW FROM 
AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN 420-21 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1970) (1908); KURT 
RAAFLAUB, THE DISCOVERY OF FREEDOM IN ANCIENT GREECE 47 (Renate 
Franciscono trans., Univ. Chicago Press 2004); ALAN WATSON, ROMAN LAW AND 
COMPARATIVE LAW 9-10 (1991); Trevor Bloom, What Was It Like to Be a Slave in 
Ancient Rome?, http://www.trevorbloom.com/2010/12/what-was-it-like-to-be-a-
slave-in-ancient-rome/ [https://perma.cc/2BB9-G64C] (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) 
(noting that debtors could be claimed as slaves in Rome); Slaves & Freemen, PBS,
http://www.pbs.org/empires/romans/empire/slaves_freemen.html [https://perma.cc/
A8Q5-A3QZ] (last visited Jan. 22, 2018) (describing Romans selling their children 
into slavery). On modern debt slavery, see Ann Jordan, Slavery, Forced Labor, Debt 
Bondage, and Human Trafficking: From Conceptional Confusion to Targeted 
Solutions, CTR. FOR HUM. RTS. & HUMANITARIAN L. (Feb. 2011), 
http://traffickingroundtable.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Issue-Paper-2-Slavery-
Forced-Labor-Debt-Bondage-and-Human-Trafficking.pdf [https://perma.cc/G3R2-
GMLX]. In Biblical law, Exodus 21:6-7 provides for a man to essentially sell 
himself into slavery to keep his wife and for a father to sell his daughter into slavery.
63. PATTERSON, supra note 3, at 125. Roman law allowed a husband to kill 
his wife for adultery but did not allow him to sell her into bondage.
64. See DRESCHER, supra note 3, at 13. Where race was involved, 
enslavement of captured soldiers lingered. After the Pequot War in Connecticut 
captured Indians, men, women, and children were enslaved in New England and 
some were sold to the Caribbean. See LORENZO JOHNSTON GREENE, THE NEGRO IN 
COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND 1620-1776, at 62 (1942). During the American Civil War 
Confederate soldiers seized free blacks in the North, sold them into slavery, and 
threatened to sell captured U.S. Army soldiers if they were black. See generally Paul 
Finkelman, Francis Lieber and the Modern Law of War, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 2071
(2013) (reviewing JOHN FABIAN WITT, LINCOLN’S CODE: THE LAWS OF WAR IN 
AMERICAN HISTORY (2012)).
65. See PATTERSON, supra note 3, at 105-15.
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status. Vulnerability to enslavement—what we might call 
“enslaveablity”—was not limited by race, religion, or ethnicity. And 
anyone, anywhere, in the wrong place at the wrong time, could be 
enslaved. On the other side of the Mediterranean, Islamic texts 
supported the idea that when dealing with captured soldiers or other 
captured enemies, “enslavement” was “a merciful substitute for 
death.”66
Most cultures and communities preferred to enslave 
foreigners—the ancient Greeks considered all foreigners to be 
“barbarians,” ripe for enslavement, while Biblical law made it far 
easier to enslave a stranger than a fellow Hebrew. But members of 
both societies ended up in bondage in their own countries. As the 
historian M.I. Finley observed, while most classical slaves were 
“barbarians” from other cultures, there were also “Greek slaves in 
Greece [and] Italian slaves in Rome.”67 Similarly, there were Chinese 
slaves in China, Russian slaves in Russia, and Muslim slaves in 
Islamic societies. Europeans enslaved each other throughout the 
ancient world and well into the modern period. In medieval Europe, 
foundlings as well as children fathered by Catholic priests were 
enslaved, even though they were ethnically members of the 
community that put them in bondage.68 Across Africa, people were 
held in slavery by members of their own community as well as by 
outsiders. In West Africa, Igbos enslaved Yorubas and vice versa, 
but Igbos or Yorubas also held their kinsmen in bondage, just as 
Italians had held other Italians as slaves.69 Sometimes the slaves were 
66. CLARENCE-SMITH, supra note 36, at 26.
67. FINLEY, supra note 30, at 118.
68. See Brodie, supra note 34.
69. See DAVIS, supra note 6, at 38-39 (explaining Greek enslavement of 
foreigners); FINLEY, supra note 30, at 18; Yvon Garlan, War, Piracy and Slavery in 
the Greek World, in CLASSICAL SLAVERY 9, 13-14 (M.I. Finley ed., 1987) (exploring 
how Greeks sometimes enslaved their own); see also WATSON, supra note 58, at 2-3
(describing the multitude of races enslaved by Romans); WATSON, supra note 62, at 
39. For examples of specialized studies of slavery, see generally MUHAMMAD A.
DANDAMAEV, SLAVERY IN BABYLONIA: FROM NABOPOLASSAR TO ALEXANDER THE 
GREAT (1984); YVON GARLAN, SLAVERY IN ANCIENT GREECE (Janet Lloyd trans., 
Cornell Univ. Press 1988) (1982); RICHARD HELLIE, SLAVERY IN RUSSIA 1450-1725
(1982); RUTH MAZO KARRAS, SLAVERY AND SOCIETY IN MEDIEVAL SCANDINAVIA
(1988); PHILLIPS, supra note 40; EHUD R. TOLEDANO, THE OTTOMAN SLAVE TRADE 
AND ITS SUPPRESSION: 1840-1890 (1982); CARL O. WILLIAMS, THRALDOM IN 
ANCIENT ICELAND (1937); SLAVERY IN AFRICA: HISTORICAL AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL 
PERSPECTIVES (Suzanne Miers & Igor Kopytoff eds., 1977); SLAVERY AND OTHER 
FORMS OF UNFREE LABOUR (Léonie J. Archer ed., 1988) (a collection of specialized 
studies of slavery in varying locations).
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neighbors and enemies; sometimes they were people from within the 
community who ended up as slaves for economic, legal, or social 
reasons. For the development of international law the key point is 
that no ancient or medieval cultures questioned the status of those 
enslaved by other cultures.70 In the ancient and medieval worlds, 
people accepted slaves as they found them.
Illustrative of the acceptance of slave status from one culture to 
the next is the story of the selling of Joseph in the Book of Genesis. 
Joseph was the favored and clearly spoiled youngest son of the 
patriarch Jacob, who had given his son “a coat of many colors.”71 At 
age seventeen, Joseph relished his father’s favoritism. He told his 
older brothers72 he had dreamed that one day they would be 
subservient to him. Given this favoritism combined with the 
teenager’s arrogance, it is perhaps not surprising that his many older 
brothers “hated him . . . [and] could not speak a friendly word to 
him.”73 When their hatred boiled over, the brothers “sold Joseph for 
twenty pieces of silver to the Ishmaelites, who brought Joseph to 
Egypt.”74 For ancient societies this was a plausible solution to 
rivalries. The Ishmaelites accepted Joseph as they found him: a youth 
devoid of any trappings of his status as the son (and especially a 
favored son) of an elite family. He appeared to be a slave, and those 
who sold him to the Ishmaelites clearly held him in captivity. 
According to the account, the Ishmaelites never asked how or why 
Joseph became a slave or who his family was. They took Joseph as 
they found him—a teenager in bondage. The Ishmaelites later sold 
Joseph into Egypt. No one in this story doubted that he was a slave, 
legitimately reduced to that status by the people who sold him to the 
Ishmaelites. The fact of Joseph’s slave status—and its acceptance by 
the Ishmaelites and later the Egyptians—is emblematic of the law of 
enslavement and of international practice at the time.
Violence was common to the process of enslavement from 
antiquity to the eve of the discovery of the New World. From the 
70. An exception to this seems to be the Biblical laws, which encouraged 
Hebrews to shelter fugitive slaves—if they were also Hebrews—who escaped from 
foreign masters. “You shall not turn over to his master a slave who seeks refuge with 
you from his master. He shall live with you in any place he may choose among the 
settlements in your midst, wherever he pleases; you must not ill-treat him.” 
Deuteronomy 23:16-17 (JPS Tanakh 1985).
71. See Genesis 37:3 (JPS Tanakh 1985).
72. All of them were actually his half-brothers, since the father, Jacob, had 
children with his two wives and two slaves.
73. Genesis 37:4 (JPS Tanakh 1985).
74. Id. at 37:3, 4, 23-28 (JPS Tanakh 1985).
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eighth century, Viking traders raided Slavic, Irish, and Scottish 
villages, bringing massive numbers of slaves to the European side of 
the Mediterranean. Later, as Europeans from nations bordering on 
the Atlantic and Mediterranean and Muslims from North Africa and 
the Indian Ocean basin would endorse (and sometimes participate) in 
the replication of this process of capture and enslavement throughout 
sub-Sahara Africa. Purchasers of Slavs or Celts in the Mediterranean 
never asked about the provenance of these slaves—the fact that the 
slaves arrived as captives and were available for purchase was 
sufficient to establish “good title” to the human chattels. Similarly, 
when Africans arrived in the New World, they came as 
merchandise—often with paperwork that constituted a transferrable 
title to this chattel property that was being sold in a legitimate and 
legally recognized form of commerce. No one questioned the 
provenance or legitimacy of the paper work. Courts in Europe saw 
the slave trade as just one more form of economic activity conducted 
under traditional and established notions of commercial law. On the 
other southern side of the Mediterranean, in the Islamic world, slaves 
arrived from sub-Sahara Africa (or Europe), and no one questioned 
their status. As “unbelievers,” they were inherently subject to capture 
and enslavement under Islamic law. Starting in the late fifteenth 
century, “the Ottomans demanded proof that imported slaves were 
prisoners of war,” but apparently the proof consisted of a document 
that could be purchased from Ottoman officials, thus “in effect 
becoming an import duty.”75 The legal fiction of the purchased 
document simply underscored how law on both sides of the 
Mediterranean (and later on both sides of the Atlantic) 
simultaneously created and maintained systems of slavery. Other 
Muslims argued against “acquiring slaves who had lived as free 
people in ethnic groups known to be Muslim,” but they also 
concluded that “the benefit of the doubt” should be with the 
purchaser because “property rights were guaranteed in holy law.”76
The same sort of practices and legal fictions were found on the 
Christian side of the Mediterranean as well.
IV. SLAVERY, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND EUROPEAN EXPANSION
From its inception, the Atlantic slave trade emerged as one of 
the great engines of capital accumulation and the creation of wealth. 
75. CLARENCE-SMITH, supra note 36, at 33.
76. Id. at 33, 129.
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Individuals, ship captains, companies, investors, port cities, and 
eventually whole nations grew rich on the trade in human beings 
while slaveowners, and eventually industrialists, became wealthy 
from the agricultural and mineral products these slaves produced. 
The huge profits from precious minerals (gold, silver, and emeralds), 
sugar, tobacco, rice, cotton, and coffee were in part possible because 
the labor from slaves was so inexpensive. Some of this new wealth 
returned to Europe, some remained in the hands of European settlers 
in the New World, and some ended up in West Africa. 
From the early sixteenth century until the middle of the 
nineteenth century, slavery flourished in the New World, with a 
growing body of law supporting it. By the end of the seventeenth 
century, the British settlements in the New World had a growing 
body of colonial statues, precedents, executive actions, common 
practices, and imperial statutes and court decisions to regulate 
slavery. Traditional contract and commercial law supported the 
Atlantic trade while the American colonists adapted well-understood 
concepts of property, contract, personal injury (trespass at the time,
which was before the invention of tort law), and criminal law to 
support slavery. In the non-English colonies, Roman and civil law 
traditions made the legal transition even easier. As one scholar has 
noted, “The Spanish and Portuguese came from slaveholding 
cultures, and simply expanded existing law to the New World. 
France, Holland, Sweden, and Denmark also easily adapted their 
civil law traditions and Roman law heritage to accommodate New 
World slavery.”77 Thus, “the Romans left slavery as a major legacy, 
whose distant legatees were the slaves and slaveowners of the 
Americas.”78
As noted above, until the 1770s there were few reformist 
challenges to slavery (although slaves themselves often resisted their 
status and condition). In the 1640s and 1650s, both the 
Massachusetts Bay colony and the Rhode Island colony passed laws 
to keep slavery out of their jurisdictions, but the laws were 
ineffective and ignored.79 By the end of the century, slavery was 
77. See ALAN WATSON, SLAVE LAW IN THE AMERICAS (1989).
78. PHILLIPS, supra note 40, at 16.
79. 1 JOHN RUSSELL BARTLETT, RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF RHODE ISLAND 
AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS, 1636-1663, at 243 (Rhode Island, A. Crawford 
Greene & Brothers, State Printers 1856). The Rhode Island law of 1652 required 
that anyone brought into the colony as a servant or slave had to be freed after ten 
years. The law specifically referred to the “common course practised amongst 
English men to buy negers.” Id.; see also 1 SAMUEL GREENE ARNOLD, HISTORY OF 
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openly practiced in both colonies. On the eve of the American 
Revolution most Quaker meetings, Mennonite and other pietist 
churches, some Baptist churches, and the newly founded Methodist 
church had denounced slavery and encouraged their members to give 
up slaveholding. But these faiths had only a small number of 
adherents, concentrated in a few places in the British colonies with 
some followers in England. The established western European 
churches—Roman Catholic; Anglican (Church of England); Scottish 
Presbyterian; Lutheran; and Dutch Reformed; as well as many 
minor, less powerful churches—all accepted slavery, with their 
members and the churches themselves participating in it. In England 
there were a few active opponents of slavery, but they had little 
influence and no power. Slavery and the African trade helped drive 
the English economy, but many in the country were probably 
unaware of the full extent of slavery’s relationship to the economy 
and the rising prosperity of the nation. Most of those who did know 
had no interest in undermining that economic engine.
Before the nineteenth century, European legal scholars 
regarded the historical development of New World slavery as 
relatively insignificant. The traditional categories of the Civil Law 
weighed far more heavily in their scholarship. Echoing classical and 
medieval legal thought, slavery retained its traditional place as an 
integral and consensual element of the law of nations. Jurists, 
philosophers, and theologians considered slavery consistent with 
natural reason and natural law. As Aristotle had explained: 
But is there any one thus intended by nature to be a slave, and for whom 
such a condition is expedient and right, or rather is not all slavery a 
violation of nature? There is no difficulty in answering this question, on 
grounds both of reason and of fact. For that some should rule and others 
be ruled is a thing not only necessary, but expedient; from the hour of their 
birth, some are marked out for subjection, others for rule.80
St. Augustine did not argue that people were naturally slaves, 
but in 419 C.E. he asserted that slavery was a punishment for human 
sin and endorsed the legitimacy of the enslavement of captives 
acquired in a “just war.” Other early Church Fathers, such as St. 
Gregory Nazianzen (about 380 C.E.) and St. John Chrysostom (about 
400 C.E.), also accepted the notion that the source of slavery was sin, 
THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS, 1636-1700, at 240
(New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1859). 
80. Aristotle, Politics: Book 1, Part V, http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/
politics.1.one.html [https://perma.cc/6RTN-P7E2] (last visited Jan. 22, 2018); see 
also DAVIS, supra note 6, at 65; Drescher & Finkelman, supra note 2, at 897-98.
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but also that it was a legitimate status as a result of actual or 
inherited sin. Later church leaders, such as St. Agobard of Lyon 
(ninth century), St. Thomas Aquinas (thirteenth century), and St.
Bonaventure (thirteenth century), similarly accepted slavery. These 
views, and the support of so many church leaders, made slavery—
and the status of a slave—fully accepted in the international law of 
early Christendom.81
Theological support for slavery dovetailed with the secular 
notions that slavery was logically derived from the virtually 
universal phenomena of war, captivity, and poverty. Ayala 
Balthazar, Cornelius van Bynkershock, Hugo Grotius, Samuel von 
Puffendorf, and other commentators from the fifteenth to the early 
eighteenth centuries all agreed that the law of nations sanctioned 
slavery, although they often cited or praised Western Europeans as 
having abandoned the practice within Christian Europe. Thomas 
More considered slavery as an integral part of society, and his 
Utopia (1516) assumed that every household would have slaves, 
either imported from another country where they were legally 
enslaved or local residents convicted of crimes.82 Nearly two 
centuries later, the English libertarian philosopher John Locke began 
his First Treatise on Government by asserting that “[s]lavery is so 
vile and miserable an estate of man, and so directly opposite to the 
generous temper and courage of our nation; that it is hardly to be 
conceived, that an Englishman, much less a gentleman, should plead 
for it.”83 But, however “vile” slavery was, Locke provided for it in 
his draft of the Fundamental Constitution of Carolina (1669), and 
though an Englishman who doubtless considered himself a 
gentleman, he personally invested in the Royal Africa Company, 
which imported a steady supply of African slaves to the British 
Caribbean. His Second Treatise on Government (1690) provided the 
very argument for slavery that he said no English gentleman “should 
81. MAXWELL, supra note 17, at 34-35, 38-39, 46-47. While designated as 
“saints” in this Article, it is important to remember that they did not have that status 
until after their deaths.
82. THOMAS MORE, UTOPIA (Edward Arber ed., Ralph Robinson trans., 
London 1869) (1516). More was knighted in 1621, after the publication of Utopia.
He was beatified in 1886 and canonized, becoming St. Thomas More in 1935, four-
hundred years after his execution in 1535. Because Utopia was not a religious text, 
and More’s positions on slavery were not connected to religious doctrine, we have 
not designated More as St. Thomas More in the text above.
83. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 1 (Thomas Hollis ed., 
London, A. Millar et al. 1794) (1690).
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plead for.”84 The Second Treatise affirmed a right to enslave others, 
arguing: 
But there is another sort of servants, which by a peculiar name we call 
slaves, who being captives taken in a just war, are by the right of nature 
subjected to the absolute dominion and arbitrary power of their masters. 
These men having, as I say, forfeited their lives, and with it their liberties, 
and lost their estates; and being in the state of slavery, not capable of any 
property, cannot in that state be considered as any part of civil society; the 
chief end whereof is the preservation of property.85
The theorists of the Enlightenment might have believed in self-
government, but that was not incompatible with holding others in 
slavery. Indeed, some enlightenment thinkers argued that slavery 
was essential for self-government. This seeming paradox made some 
sense historically and also for contemporary slaveowners in the New 
World. Democracy began in Athens, where the majority of the 
population consisted of slaves. The availability of slaves allowed 
democracy to flourish for the master class because “the free male 
Greek citizen needed time and leisure to participate in civic society 
and make use of his rational thought and creative powers.”86 Indeed, 
Aristotle noted, “[I]t is the mark of a free man not to live at another’s 
beck and call.”87 This celebration of slavery as a civic virtue became 
a hallmark of proslavery thought in the American South. Edmund 
Morgan has argued that the presence of slavery ironically led to the 
beginnings of democracy and popular government in colonial 
Virginia and then to the Revolution itself. In the early eighteenth 
century, slavery “enabled Virginians large and small to join with 
other Americans in devotion to freedom and equality, in abhorrence 
of slavery—and in the preservation of slaveholding.”88 Aristotle 
would have recognized the argument and agreed with it. As Morgan 
notes: 
The presence of men and women who were, in law at least, almost totally 
subject to the will of other men gave to those in control of them an 
immediate experience of what it could mean to be at the mercy of a tyrant. 
Virginians may have had a special appreciation of the freedom dear to
84. Id.
85. DAVIS, supra note 3, at 118; LOCKE, supra note 83, at 85.
86. DAVIS, supra note 6, at 41. See also ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC, Book 1, 
Chap. 9.
87. Id.
88. EDMUND S. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM: THE 
ORDEAL OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA 369 (1975).
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republicans, because they saw every day what life without it could be 
like.89
Morgan’s argument does not explain why northerners who had 
no slaves and abhorred the institution, like Samuel Adams, John 
Adams, Gouverneur Morris, or Alexander Hamilton, were at least as 
committed to republican freedom as the slavemasters of Virginia. 
Morris had grown up in a slaveholding family in New York and 
deeply hated the institution, as did Hamilton, who had grown up in 
the British Caribbean, where slavery was a fundamental part of 
everyday life. Indeed, many of these northerners (as well as men who 
had or continued to have a few slaves, like Benjamin Franklin and 
John Jay) used the Revolutionary ideology to fight slavery and help 
end it in their home states. Adams drafted the Massachusetts 
Constitution of 1780, which was used to end slavery in the state; 
Franklin was the president of the Pennsylvania Abolition Society; as 
governor of New York, Jay signed that state’s gradual abolition act 
of 1799. Both he and Hamilton were founding members of the New 
York manumission society. Thus the argument that slaveowning 
made some Americans more sensitive to liberty runs into a problem: 
Many patriots who owned no slaves and hated slavery were just as 
committed to liberty and freedom as their slaveowning fellow 
patriots from the South.
However, Morgan’s argument helps explain why elite, wealthy 
southerners—men who aped the English nobility and fancied 
themselves to be an American version of Britain’s aristocracy—so 
easily became revolutionaries, adopted Locke’s political theory of 
the rights of man, and openly declared their support for equality, 
liberty, and extending political rights to men who were beneath them 
in social status, wealth, and education. They were just careful to 
exclude their slaves (and their tiny number of free black neighbors) 
from the benefits of the ideology. For them, slavery (and race) 
became the bright line separation between “free” men who were to 
be self-governing and “unfree” men who were forever excluded from
participating in the polity. 
Slavery also had an enormously practical effect on the 
Revolution. Slave-grown tobacco and the expectation of future 
wealth from tobacco helped the Americans secure loans in Europe. 
Meanwhile, many elite southerners served in the Army or the state or 
national governments throughout the war without worrying about 
making a living because their slaves back home were still toiling on 
89. See id. at 376.
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their behalf. The long list of slave-holding patriot leaders—
Washington, Jefferson, Henry, Mason, various Lees, Madison, 
Monroe, various Pinckneys in South Carolina, and Carrolls in 
Maryland—was in part a result of the freedom slaveholding gave 
these gentlemen to pursue civic affairs. Virginia’s slaveowners thus 
became leaders of the Revolution and the New Nation, leading to the 
odd contradiction of masters of slaves arguing for universal liberty 
(except for their own slaves). The Virginians (and other southern 
aristocrats) evolved into a ruling class of slaveowners leading a 
revolution predicated on liberty but that simultaneously protected 
their right to keep their slaves. The English Tory Samuel Johnson 
noted the irony of this situation, asking, “How is it that we hear the 
loudest yelps for liberty among the drivers of negroes?”90 But, the 
answer was in part that the “drivers of negroes” had the most time, 
the most money, and a great incentive to preserve their world from 
any future interference by Parliament, the English courts, or the 
Crown. The antislavery movement in Britain was extremely small at 
this time, and the decision in Somerset v. Stewart (1772), which we 
discuss below, was narrowly limited to England. But Lord 
Mansfield’s language in Somerset, that slavery was “odious,” was 
certainly a cause for concern among American masters. It would be 
too much to argue that a fear of emancipation by the British 
government led to the Revolution, but it is clear that many masters in 
the southern colonies were deeply troubled by the decision and by 
the apparent rise of passionate opponents of slavery in the
Metropolis.
From the Revolution to the Civil War, southern intellectuals 
such as Thomas Jefferson, John C. Calhoun, and George Fitzhugh 
claimed that slavery allowed them the leisure to pursue philosophy, 
literature, and politics. Southern politicians similarly argued that 
slavery made democracy possible because it prevented the dangerous 
lower classes—what Senator James Henry Hammond called the 
90. PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN 
THE AGE OF JEFFERSON 58 (3d ed.) (2014). For the impact of the American 
Revolution on British abolitionist emergence, see CHRISTOPHER LESLIE BROWN,
MORAL CAPITAL: FOUNDATIONS OF BRITISH ABOLITIONISM 209-58 (2006). For 
British post-war emergence of an antislavery movement, see Seymour Drescher, The 
Shocking Birth of British Abolitionism, 33 SLAVERY & ABOLITION 571, 571-93
(2012).
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“mudsill” of society—from participating in politics and corrupting 
the system.91
VI. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF SLAVERY
While slavery was developing in the New World in the early 
sixteenth century—first for Indians and later for Africans—the very 
nature of war still gave victors the power of life or death over 
captured enemy soldiers and civilians potentially attenuated by 
enslavement. Europeans were proud that they no longer invoked the 
power of enslavement over fellow Christians, noting this was a 
fortunate exception to the general rule that slavery remained integral 
to the law of nations. Christian Europeans no longer enslaved one 
another during and after wars. While the institution could be limited 
or modified by municipal law, it still remained part of the world’s 
rational legal order. Thus a French legal scholar, François Delaunay, 
“could affirm that colonial slavery was in no way contrary to 
Christianity, and yet take satisfaction from the fact that in France all 
men were free.”92 Even where major early modern commentators on 
the law of nations congratulated Europeans on having diminished the 
unlimited rights of enslavement by conquest, their focus was entirely 
Eurocentric. In the colonies—“Beyond the Line” of European law 
and society—the enslavement of Indians and then Africans was 
permitted.
It seems unlikely that any of these international law theorists 
were significantly influenced or even bothered by the enslavement of 
New World natives and the subsequent expansion of New World 
slavery with the African slave trade in the Atlantic world. They
certainly paid little attention to this new development in world 
history, and the contrast between the lawyers’ treatment of slavery 
and piracy is striking. In no other aspect of early modern 
international law can the domination of antiquity be seen so clearly 
as in the differing treatment of slavery and piracy. The Civil Law 
tradition unequivocally declared that pirates were hostis humani 
generis—common enemies of the human race. Piracy was 
designated, without hesitation, as an affront to the consensual law of 
91. Senator James Henry Hammond’s speech, known as the “Mudsill 
Speech” (1858), is reprinted in FINKELMAN, supra note 42, at 80-88.
92. DAVIS, supra note 6, at 110, 114-20.
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nations. Its practitioners could be hung on the gibbet by the subjects 
of any ruler who seized them.93
Those who had to deal with the maritime aspects of 
international law could not so easily dodge the increasing 
involvement of Europe in the slave trade. Charles Malloy’s De Jure 
Maritimo et Navali (1682) still confidently assumed that slavery was 
a general, if not quite a universal, institution. Under certain 
conditions, Malloy reiterated, enslavement was not repugnant to 
“natural justice by covenant” (voluntary) or by “Transgression” 
(involuntary). European princes had universally agreed (the 
consensual requisite) “to esteem the words, Slave, Bondsman or 
Villain [as] barbarous.”94 In England, legal slavery no longer existed, 
and trover could not be maintained even for a “More [Moor] or other 
Indian.” Yet Englishmen traded in slaves in the Atlantic world and in 
the New World. The idea of the absence of international law 
“Beyond the Line”—on the other side of the Atlantic or off the coast 
of Africa—came to the rescue to rationalize the difference between 
enslaving Europeans on one side of the ocean (which they rejected) 
and enslaving Indians and then Africans on the other side of the 
ocean (which they accepted). Natural and mathematical laws had 
more certitude than civil law. But human activities were subjected to 
different “certitudes” in different latitudes and longitudes.95 It was 
not only the legal tradition, but also the reality of slavery that 
weighed upon lawyers and philosophers in considering the ubiquity 
of slavery in human society, even as Europeans proudly claimed they 
had eliminated it in their home countries.96 From a global 
perspective, Europe’s rulers appeared as committed to perpetuating 
bondage on the eve of the American Revolution as they had been 
when the Portuguese had purchased their first slaves on the coast of 
Africa three centuries earlier. In 1772 Arthur Young, a political 
arithmetician, offered a birds eye view of bondage in global 
93. Compare Emer de Vattel’s discomfort at having to even discuss slavery 
as part of the ius gentium with his zest in sanctioning of the casual dispatch of 
pirates to their fate. EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE 
LAW OF NATURE, APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND 
SOVEREIGNS, WITH THREE EARLY ESSAYS ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF NATURAL 
LAW AND ON LUXURY §§ 152, 233 (Béla Kapossy & Richard Whatmore eds., Liberty 
Fund 2008) (1758). 
94. CHARLES MOLLOY, MARITIMO ET NAVALI; OR, A TREATISE OF AFFAIRS 
MARITIME AND OF COMMERCE IN THREE BOOKS 387 (Text Creation Partnership 
2003) (1682).
95. Id. at 335-36.
96. These claims were of course not always true.
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perspective. Young estimated that of the earth’s 775 million 
inhabitants, all but 33 million could be classified as unfree.97
VII. THE INTERNATIONAL REJECTION OF SLAVERY
There were scattered challenges to this legal world. In sixteenth 
century France, Jean Bodin had argued that slavery was wrong,98 and 
there were a few cases in France and England of freeing slaves 
brought there from other jurisdictions, but there were also cases and 
legal opinions going the other way.99
The great challenge to the accepted legal regime—that slavery 
was acceptable and legal—came in 1772, in Somerset v. Stewart.100
Charles Stewart, a colonial customs official, had brought his slave 
James Somerset with him when he returned to England. When 
Somerset ran away, Stewart hired thugs to track him down and 
forcibly confine him in a ship headed for the West Indies, where 
Somerset would be sold. Lawyers with antislavery sentiments 
obtained a writ of habeas corpus, which brought Somerset’s status 
before William Murray, Chief Justice Lord Mansfield of the Court of 
King’s Bench. These issues boiled down to one simple question: 
Could a person be held against his or her will as a slave in England? 
Lord Mansfield had no doubt that English law respected the 
institution of slavery in the Empire, and thus the courts would settle a 
dispute over the sale or delivery of slaves in the American colonies: 
“Contract for sale of a slave is good here; the sale is a matter to 
which the law properly and readily attaches, and will maintain the 
price according to the agreement.”101
97. Drescher & Finkelman, supra note 2, at 898.
98. See generally MALICK W. GHACHEM, THE OLD REGIME AND THE 
HAITIAN REVOLUTION (2012); SUE PEABODY, “THERE ARE NO SLAVES IN FRANCE”:
THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF RACE AND SLAVERY IN THE ANCIEN RÉGIME (1996).
99. See DAVIS, supra note 6, at 46; see generally Cartwright’s Case (1569)
2 Rushworth 468 (Eng.) (freeing a Russian slave brought to England); Smith v.
Brown & Cooper, 91 Eng. Rep. 566 (the date to the English Reports is unknown, but 
is assumed to be either the late seventeenth or every early eighteenth century) 
(holding by Chief Justice Holt that when a negro comes into England, he becomes 
free); Opinion of Sir Philip York, then Attorney-General, and Mr. Talbot, Solicitor-
General, 33 Decision of the Court of Session in the Form of a Dictionary 14547 
(1729) (asserting that a slave does not become free by being brought to England); 
Shanley v. Harvey, 2 Eden 126 (1762) (holding by Lord Chancellor that slaves 
brought to England became free).
100. (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (KB).
101. Id. at 509.
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But the issue in this case was not the status of a slave in some 
remote colony thirty-five to forty-five hundred miles from England 
in the age of sail. In cases involving the sale of slaves in the 
Caribbean or the mainland colonies, the English courts literally, 
legally, and figuratively did not “see” the slave. The slaves were just 
objects mentioned in a contract, no different than horses or cords of 
wood. Somerset’s case was dramatically and visually different, as a 
living slave physically appeared to seek his freedom before 
England’s highest court. Mansfield felt the power of this distinction: 
“But here the person of the slave himself is immediately the object of 
enquiry; which makes a very material difference. The now question 
is, whether any dominion, authority or coercion can be exercised in 
this country, on a slave according to the American laws[.]”102 Such a 
relationship violated the common law of England and centuries of 
English public policy and tradition. More than that, the presence of a 
slave would necessarily lead to behavior that was unacceptable in 
England. “The difficulty of adopting the relation, without adopting it 
in all its consequences, is indeed extreme; and yet, many of those 
consequences are absolutely contrary to the municipal law of 
England.”103 The very fact that Stewart hired men to capture 
Somerset, violently attack and abuse him in public, and cart him off 
tied up (or chained) to be held on a ship illustrated Mansfield’s fear 
of allowing slavery in the Metropolis. Mansfield understood that 
because it was impossible to separate slavery from the violence and 
unrestrained power that made any system of slavery possible.
After serious consideration, Mansfield ruled in favor of liberty 
at home, setting out why a slave brought to England was free:
So high an act of dominion [as holding someone as a slave] must be 
recognized by the law of the country where it is used. The power of a 
master over his slave has been extremely different, in different countries. 
The state of slavery is of such a nature, that it is incapable of being 
introduced on any reasons, moral or political; but only positive law, which 
preserves its force long after the reasons, occasion, and time itself from 
whence it was created, is erased from memory: it’s so odious, that nothing 
can be suffered to support it, but positive law.104
Somerset was not an “emancipation proclamation” for the 
slaves in England—mostly domestic servants or maritime workers—
102. Id.
103. Id. While not discussed in the opinion, one subtext to this is that 
England did not have to follow the laws of its colonies, although plausibly, the 
colonies might have to follow the law of England.
104. Id. at 510.
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brought over by colonial plantation managers, government officials 
(like Charles Stewart), absentee landlords who visited their West 
Indian plantations once in a while, or slave traders who took a liking 
to a particular slave or needed an extra crewman. Recent research 
suggests there were in fact very few slaves in England at the time 
and that the black population was substantially smaller than 
Mansfield believed.105 Some blacks in England undoubtedly 
remained in the custody of their owners (or former owners) after 
Somerset. But those who chose to be free could simply walk away, 
and their owners—who no longer had a legal right to own them—
could do nothing about it. More importantly, Somerset set the stage 
for an end to slavery in the British Isles and eventually the entire 
Empire. Mansfield had, with a few strokes of his pen, undermined 
the moral basis of bondage, as well as its legal basis in Britain. 
Slavery was now officially “odious,” at least in England and 
perhaps by extension in the rest of Europe as well. One of the most 
distinguished jurists in the world had determined that slavery was 
purely a creature of municipal or local law and that without specific 
statutory authority, no jurisdiction was obligated to recognize the 
“status” of a slave created by another jurisdiction. Governments or 
courts might now determine that contracts for “odious” commerce 
were not enforceable. Or they might recognize contracts for the sale 
of slaves in places where slavery was legal. This was Mansfield’s 
position, which he maintained for the rest of his career. In Somerset,
he acknowledged that the court would enforce a contract for the sale 
of a slave in the colonies. 
The issue of contract for slaves came before Mansfield a 
decade later in the horrifying case Gregson v. Gilbert,106 which 
involved insurance claims for the value of slaves thrown overboard 
from the slaver The Zong. Overloaded, mismanaged, and 
dangerously off course, the crew of The Zong had thrown about 150 
105. In Somerset Lord Mansfield estimated there were 12,000 to 15,000 
slaves in England. Recent research suggests there were in fact fewer blacks in 
England and that most were viewed as servants, rather than slaves. However, as 
“servants” brought to England by people who had owned them in America or the 
Caribbean, they may have seen themselves as mired in bondage or simple lacked the 
knowledge and resources to strike out on their own. Kathy Chater, Black People in 
England, 1660-1807, in THE BRITISH SLAVE TRADE: ABOLITION, PARLIAMENT, AND 
PEOPLE 66, 66-69 (Stephen Farrell, Melanie Unwin & James Walvin eds., 2007).
Chater may undercount the total black and slave population, because of slaves being 
brought back from the colonies as transients, but her evidence shows that the 
population was still less than a tenth of what Mansfield thought it was.
106. See Gregson v. Gilbert, (1783) 99 Eng. Rep. 629 (K.B.).
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slaves overboard, claiming that because the ship was running out of 
water, it was necessary to jettison some of the “cargo” to save the 
rest. When the insurance company refused to pay on the claim, 
Gregson, a major slave trader from Liverpool, sued. 
At one level, this case simply involved maritime law and 
insurance law. It was permissible to jettison some cargo out of 
necessity to save the rest of the cargo, and under such a necessity the 
insurers were bound to pay on the policy. Callously, Mansfield noted 
that under English insurance and maritime law, if the slaves were 
thrown overboard because of necessity due to a shortage of water, 
“though it shocks one very much,” in terms of law “the case of 
slaves was the same as if Horses had been thrown overboard.”107
With some understatement, Mansfield nonetheless concluded, “It is a 
very shocking case.”108 In the end, the insurers did not have to pay on 
the policy because of compelling evidence that throwing the slaves 
overboard was unnecessary. Nevertheless, the case of The Zong
underscored the horrors of the slave trade. That English insurance 
law traveled with a slaver complicated the law, but The Zong still 
demonstrated that “Beyond the Line” of European civilization, 
intentionally drowning about 150 human beings was not murder and 
might have been the basis of a legitimate insurance claim for lost 
property. The insurance company won because the facts of the case 
demonstrated that some of the drownings were unnecessary (because 
it had rained and the ship now had adequate water), and all of the 
drownings might have been the result of incompetence on the part of 
those managing the ship. But, with better facts, the owners of The 
Zong might have won because “Beyond the Line” jettisoning 
cargo—human cargo—was not necessarily wrong. Out on the 
Atlantic Ocean, “Beyond the Line” of European rules and legal 
culture, it was still business as usual for slave traders and their New 
World customers.
Nevertheless, despite the continued legal recognition of slavery 
on the African coast and in the New World and the willingness of 
English courts to uphold the legality of the business of the slave 
trade, Somerset marked a major and deeply significant change in the 
international law of slavery. Slavery had always been “odious,” at 
least to the slaves. But now, according to one of the most important 
jurists in the world, who sat on the highest court of the most 
107. See JAMES WALVIN, THE ZONG: A MASSACRE, THE LAW AND THE END OF 
SLAVERY 153 (2011) (original emphasis removed).
108. Id. 
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powerful nation in Europe, it was odious to the law as well. Somerset 
signaled the beginning to the struggle to end slavery in Britain, and 
that would soon shift to an assault on slavery everywhere. The 
struggle to fundamentally alter centuries of international law had 
begun, even though the participants in the case did not realize this.109
In the three decades following Somerset, a number of newly 
independent American states would either abolish or prohibit slavery 
outright (Massachusetts, 1780; New Hampshire, 1783; Vermont, 
1791; Ohio, 1803) or adopt gradual abolition acts (Pennsylvania, 
1780; Connecticut, 1784; Rhode Island, 1784; New York, 1799; 
New Jersey, 1804), which set slavery on the road to extinction.110
109. It is worth noting that courts in France and some jurisdictions in France 
reached a similar conclusion even before Somerset. In the 1550s, for example, a 
court in Toulouse ruled that a slave brought into that city from Genoa was 
“automatically free.” DAVIS, supra note 6, at 111. But French legislation overcame 
this problem, and masters were able to bring slaves into France for at least limited 
amounts of time. See PEABODY, supra note 98, at 16. At the beginning of the 
sixteenth century, slavery as an institution did not exist in France. WATSON, supra
note 77, at 83. Even when France had no slavery, there had always been some slaves 
in France. Peabody’s title underscores the irony that France’s legal culture provided 
some institutional support for slavery. France did not wholly adopt Roman law, but 
French lawyers and judges regularly turned to Roman law. Concepts of slavery in 
Roman and Canon law meant that the legal principles on which slavery was based 
were not entirely foreign to France. Thus, it was possible for seventeenth century 
French settlers to establish slavery in the New World and for the government in 
Paris to regulate slavery in the colonies with the introduction of the Code Noir in 
1685. Indeed, the Code Noir was created at the behest of the King, which illustrates 
how easily France accepted slavery as a legal concept. Vernon Valentine Palmer, 
The Origins and Authors of the Code Noir, 56 LA. L. REV. 363, 363 (1996). See also
WATSON, supra note 77, at 85. 
In 1716 French legislation explicitly allowed masters to bring slaves to 
France, under some limited circumstances, even as it also provided for the 
freedom of slaves brought to the metropolis contrary to the law. These 
laws illustrate how smoothly France, a nation which prided itself on not 
having slaves, adapted to slavery. Its Roman, Civil, and Canon law 
traditions made these legal developments possible.
See Paul Finkelman, Slavery in the United States: Persons or Property?, in THE 
LEGAL UNDERSTANDING OF SLAVERY: FROM THE HISTORICAL TO THE CONTEMPORARY 
107 (Jean Allain ed., 2012).
110. On emancipation in the North, see generally PAUL FINKELMAN, AN
IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM AND COMITY (1981) and ARTHUR 
ZILVERSMIT, THE FIRST EMANCIPATION: THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY IN THE NORTH
(1967). Final abolition took longer than many people might have expected, and a 
few people were held as slaves in the North in the 1840s, but by 1804 slavery was 
on the road to extinction in the North, and by 1850 it has disappeared, although a 
few thousand aged slaves in New Jersey had been converted, by statute, into 
indentured servants.
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Abolition in Massachusetts was based on the state’s 1780 
Constitution, which began: “ALL men are born free and equal, and 
have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which 
may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and 
liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in 
fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness.”111 In 
addition, in 1793 the British province of Upper Canada (modern 
Ontario) became the first entity in the British new world to begin to 
end slavery with its own gradual abolition law, an Act Against 
Slavery.112 Most of these places allowed visitors and sojourners to 
temporarily bring slaves into the jurisdiction, but violations of the 
time limits could lead to the immediate emancipation of slaves. 
Pennsylvania and New York allowed masters to visit their states with 
slaves for specific periods of time. The laws reflected concepts of
comity and international law. They also reflected the legal power of 
Somerset, because without these laws, visiting slaves would become 
instantly free.
Gradual abolition was accomplished by statute, which of 
course could be altered by a new statute. The U.S. Constitution, 
written and ratified in 1787–88, contained a specific provision for the 
recovery of fugitive slaves, which was in part an acknowledgment of 
the force of Mansfield’s opinion in Somerset.113 Because Somerset 
was part of the American common law at the time of Independence, 
the states would have been able to free any slave coming into their 
jurisdiction, whether brought in by a sojourner, or entering as a 
fugitive.114 Thus, the U.S. Constitution specifically protected the 
right of a master to recover a fugitive—in effect negating the power 
of Somerset, but the Constitution did not protect the right of visiting 
masters to travel to free states with their slaves.115
While the North was dismantling slavery, it flourished in the 
South, and politically and legally the United States remained a 
111. See MASS. CONST. art. I, annulled and amended by MASS. CONST. art. 
CVI. On the end of slavery in Massachusetts, see generally FINKELMAN, supra note 
110, at 20-45.
112. An Act to Prevent the Further Introduction of Slaves and to Limit the 
Terms of Contracts for Servitude Within This Province 1793, 33 Geo. 3 c. 7 (Gr. 
Brit).
113. See generally FINKELMAN, supra note 110.
114. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
115. FINKELMAN, supra note 110, at 38-39.
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slaveholder’s republic until the American Civil War.116 From the 
1770s until the Civil War there would be legal conflicts between the
states and the national government over slaves in transit, the 
domestic slave trade, fugitive slaves, and slavery in the federal 
territories. The U.S. Supreme Court would consistently protect 
slavery.117 Both Britain (1807)118 and the United States (1808)119
prohibited the Atlantic slave trade.120 An 1820 law declared that the 
trade constituted piracy and that both American citizens engaging in 
the African slave trade and any foreigner bringing slaves into the 
United States “shall be adjudged a pirate: and [on conviction thereof] 
before the circuit court of the United States for the district wherein 
he shall be brought, or . . . found, shall suffer death.”121 Nevertheless, 
despite federal law declaring slaving to be piracy and emphatically 
prohibiting any slaves from being brought into the country, in The 
Antelope,122 decided in 1825, Chief Justice John Marshall allowed 
illegally imported slaves to be sold for the benefit of foreign 
claimants, even though existing precedent should have led to the 
Africans on the ship being freed and returned to the continent of their 
birth.123 Marshall acknowledged that the African slave trade was 
“contrary to the law of nature,”124 but then concluded—in the face of 
the clear American statute of 1820 and subsequent laws to the 
contrary125—that it was “consistent with the law of nations” and 
116. DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE SLAVEHOLDING REPUBLIC: AN ACCOUNT 
OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT’S RELATIONS TO SLAVERY 15-38 (Ward M. 
McAfee ed., 2001).
117. See generally PAUL FINKELMAN, SUPREME INJUSTICE: SLAVERY IN THE 
NATION’S HIGHEST COURT (2018).
118. An Act for the Abolition of the Slave Trade 1807, 47 Geo. 333 c. 36.
119. An Act to Prohibit the Importation of Slaves into Any Port or Place 
Within the Jurisdiction of the United States, 2 Stat. 426 (1807).
120. Denmark did so in 1802. SUZANNE MIERS, SLAVERY IN THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY: THE EVOLUTION OF A GLOBAL PROBLEM 14 (2003).
121. An Act to Continue in Force “An Act to Protect the Commerce of the 
United States, and Punish the Crime of Piracy,” 3 Stat. 600 (1820). The statute 
provided that this penalty was to be in force for only two years, but on January 3, 
1823, Congress made it a permanent statute. An Act in Addition to “An Act to 
Continue in Force ‘An Act to Protect the Commerce of the United States, and 
Punish the Crime of Piracy,’” 3 Stat. 721 (1823).
122. 23 U.S. 66 (1825).
123. See FINKELMAN, supra note 117, at 90-102.
124. 23 U.S. at 66.
125. An Act to Continue in Force “An Act to Protect the Commerce of the 
United States, and Punish the Crime of Piracy,” 3 Stat. 600. The statute provided 
that this penalty was to be in force for only two years, but on January 3, 1823,
Congress made it a permanent statute. An Act in Addition to “An Act to Continue in 
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“cannot in itself be piracy.”126 Here, Marshall applied the concepts of 
traditional Roman civil law rather than the laws of his own country. 
Marshall thus upheld the property rights in slaves taken from Africa
who had ended up in the United States. This holding, like many 
others, protected slavery within the United States, ultimately 
culminating with decisions in Prigg v. Pennsylvania127 and Dred 
Scott v. Sandford,128 both of which proclaimed that slavery was a 
specially protected form of property under the Constitution.
But, even as slavery became solidly secure in the United States, 
internationally it became increasingly insecure. Before the Civil 
War, Southerners in the United States often referred to slavery as
“our peculiar institution.” The title of the most influential history of 
American slavery, Kenneth Stampp’s The Peculiar Institution,
suggests the way most Americans have traditionally looked at 
slavery.129 By the eve of the Civil War, white Southerners, while 
extolling the value of slavery—and preparing to fight and die to 
preserve it—fully understood that their system of organizing labor 
and controlling race relations was unacceptable to much of the world 
and was indeed “peculiar” in the mid-nineteenth century. In 1775, 
when the American Revolution began, slavery had been legal 
everywhere in the New World, from British Canada to Spanish 
Argentina and Chile—from Hudson’s Bay to Tierra del Fuego black 
slaves served their white owners. But by 1861 it existed only in 
Brazil, Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Dutch West Indies, and the American 
South. It had become peculiar even in the New World, which had 
been built to a great extent on the labor of African slaves and their
American-born descendants.
During and shortly after the Revolution, the states of the U.S. 
North ended or started to gradually end slavery, as did Upper Canada 
(Ontario). In Haiti, slaves took matters into their own hands, in the 
Force ‘An Act to Protect the Commerce of the United States, and Punish the Crime 
of Piracy,’” 3 Stat. 721.
126. The Antelope, 23 U.S. at 122.
127. 41 U.S. 539, 540 (1842). See Paul Finkelman, Story Telling on the 
Supreme Court: Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Justice Joseph Story’s Judicial 
Nationalism, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 247, 256 (1994).
128. 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1857). See generally PAUL FINKELMAN, DRED SCOTT 
V. SANDFORD: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS (2d ed. 2016).
129. See generally KENNETH STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY 
IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH (1956). Stampp’s work is important because, as Ira 
Berlin has noted, it “broke the back of the racist scholarship in which the history of 
slavery was entrapped.” IRA BERLIN, MANY THOUSANDS GONE: THE FIRST TWO 
CENTURIES OF SLAVERY IN NORTH AMERICA 487 (1998).
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only fully successful slave revolt in history. In Haiti, the slaves 
succeeded in not only defeating the master class, but in creating a 
legally recognized sovereign nation governed by those who had 
previously been slaves. In the 1810s and 1820s, Spain’s mainland 
American colonies had broken the chains of human bondage just as 
they had broken the fetters of the colonial rule. Between 1833 and 
1838, Great Britain ended slavery in its American colonies, freeing 
more than 800,000 people.130 In the 1840s, Sweden, France, and 
Denmark ended slavery in their American colonies.131 It bears 
repeating that by 1860, new world slavery was flourishing only in 
Cuba, Puerto Rico, Brazil, the Dutch colonies, and the American 
South.132 Thus, slavery had become “peculiar” in Europe and the 
Atlantic world. It became even more peculiar in the next decade. In 
1861, Tsar Alexander II ended serfdom in Russia. In 1863, the 
Netherlands finally abolished slavery in its American colonies. From 
1861 to 1865, Congress, President Lincoln, the United States army, 
and then a constitutional amendment ended slavery in the South.133
Between 1873 and 1888, the last New World holdouts finally ended 
slavery—Puerto Rico (1873), Cuba (1886), and Brazil (1888). Thus 
slavery had come to end in the “civilized world,” or at least 
Europeans flattered themselves into believing that it did at the 
Brussels Anti-Slavery Conference in 1890, during which European 
diplomats proudly, and imperialistically, asserted that they would 
end slavery everywhere in the world.
As noted at the beginning of this Article, we have mostly 
focused on the Atlantic World, which is admittedly Euro and 
American centric. However, at the end of the nineteenth century, 
while slavery was ending in the New World, it continued to flourish 
130. See Slavery Abolition Act 1833, 3 & 4 Will. 4 c. 73 (UK).
131. See 2 ERIK GØBEL, THE DANISH SLAVE TRADE AND ITS ABOLITION 174
(2016).
132. See generally ROBERT J. COTTROL, THE LONG, LINGERING SHADOW:
SLAVERY, RACE, AND LAW IN THE AMERICAN HEMISPHERE (2013). As in parts of the 
U.S. North, gradual abolition in the former Spanish mainland colonies could be an 
excruciatingly slow process. By 1830 slavery was over in Mexico, Central America, 
Chile, and the Dominican Republic, but final abolition did not come to much of 
South America until the 1850s and lingered in Bolivia and Paraguay until the 1860s.
GEORGE REID ANDREWS, AFRO-LATIN AMERICA, 1800-2000 57 (2004).
133. See Paul Finkelman, Lincoln v. The Proslavery Constitution: How a 
Railroad Lawyer’s Constitutional Theory Made Him the Great Emancipator, 47 ST.
MARY’S L.J. 63, 63-66 (2015).
The Eternal Problem of Slavery 793
in Africa and Asia.134 Moreover, even as Europeans flattered 
themselves on abolishing slavery, they continued to allow it and 
profit from it in their African and Asian colonies and trade zones. 
The best estimate is that in 1804 there were about three million 
slaves in the Americas, while in Asia there were thirty-seven million 
slaves, and five million in Africa.135 By 1850, there were four million 
slaves in the Americas, thirty-one million in Asia, and eleven million 
in Africa.136 In 1888, the bulk of the world’s slaves were still located 
where they had been at the beginning of the age of abolition a 
century earlier. Asia had the greatest proportion of slaves in the 
world, and Africa was second. Ironically, the dramatic drop in the 
transatlantic slave trade after 1850 had allowed African slavery to 
more than double. Later in the century, Europeans would justify their 
takeover of Africa—what scholars call the “scramble for Africa”—as 
a way of ending slavery there. But slavery would linger there into the 
twentieth century as Europeans profited from it.137
In Asia the British, in the 1840s, had adopted a more belated 
and less aggressive policy in overseeing the ending of slavery in their 
major imperial dominion. In India, they introduced a policy that has 
come to be called a Slow Death for Slavery, which they, and later 
other imperial powers, transferred to Africa. This was the last, and 
perhaps the most important, application of the “Mansfield strategy” 
of liberation.138
VIII. ANTISLAVERY AND THE CREATION OF MODERN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW
In the period from 1772 to the Brussels Conference in 1890, the 
world had witnessed a flourishing of international law, much of 
which had to do with slavery. Before 1772, there was universal 
acceptance of enslavement as a legitimate status based on 
internationally accepted criteria. These principles included accepting 
134. In the 1830s, England had abolished slavery in her New World 
colonies. In the 1840s, Britain had adopted a more belated and less aggressive 
policy in overseeing the ending of slavery in India. At this time, Britain introduced a 
policy that has come to be called a Slow Death for Slavery, which they, and later 
other imperial powers, transferred to Africa. See DRESCHER, supra note 3, at 269-70.
135. B.W. Higman, Demographic Trends, in 4 THE CAMBRIDGE WORLD 
HISTORY OF SLAVERY 20, 23-24 n.6 (David Eltis et al. eds., 2017).
136. Id.
137. See DRESCHER, supra note 3, at 390-97.
138. Id. at 391-96.
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the slave status of persons from other jurisdictions under a theory of 
conflicts of law or comity and the universal recognition of the 
international trade or commerce in slaves. Unlike the ancient world, 
where anyone might be a slave, starting in the sixteenth century in 
the European world, including the American colonies, slavery was 
confined to Indians and then Africans. Starting in the early nineteenth 
century, Atlantic world nations began to proscribe the slave trade, 
although the process was slow and faced resistance on both sides of 
the Atlantic. New World masters wanted more slaves, and in Africa, 
all sorts of political regimes, kingdoms, warlords, and raiders had 
grown rich selling other Africans—not their own people—to 
European traders. Neither the African nor the European traders 
wanted to see this lucrative commerce die. But, by the end of the 
nineteenth century no one—even Africans—could legitimately be 
held as a slave. During this evolutionary process, nation-states began 
to deny comity to foreign owners because they declared that slavery 
was contrary to natural law and most municipal law and tenable only 
under local positive law. This ultimately led to the modern view that 
under international law, enslavement is unacceptable exploitation 
that constitutes a crime against humanity.
The Brussels Act of 1890 came from a conference attended by 
diplomats from thirteen European countries, the United States, the 
Ottoman Empire, Persia, Zanzibar, and the Congo Free State (which 
was a phony “country” controlled by King Leopold II in his private 
capacity through a mercenary army and agents of the Association 
Internationale du Congo, a for-profit company of European investors 
headed by Leopold). The signers of the Brussels Act—the world’s 
first comprehensive multilateral treaty aimed at ending the African 
slave trade—pledged to end slavery in Africa “as far as possible.” 
Ending the trade was seen as a way of bringing “civilization” to 
Africa, while simultaneously expelling slavers who were 
predominately Muslims. But, in the end, this goal and the Brussels 
Act merely provided legal cover for brutal and violent colonization 
of the continent. As Europeans embarked on colonizing almost all of 
Africa, they claimed it was for the purpose of “civilizing” the 
continent and ending slavery there. They used the authority of the 
Brussels Act to justify this often-brutal colonization. Under the 
Brussels Act, European colonizing regimes ruthlessly suppressed the 
local slave trade and existing forms of slave trading. Often the 
suppression was more cruel (and cost more lives) than the existing 
systems of indigenous slavery. At the same time, the Brussels 
Convention enabled the colonizing government to justify the use of 
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force, including in some places, the virtual enslavement of local 
people who were “recruited” (at gunpoint) to work for European 
governments and private companies. Various kinds of forced labor 
with “slave-like” conditions, especially in the cocoa industry, 
continued into the 1930s.139
The most “ruthless and brutal” European intervention was in 
the Congo, where Leopold’s private company and mercenary army 
savagely oppressed the population, virtually enslaving vast numbers 
of people as he pretended to “civilize” the Congo. Under Leopold’s 
regime, “A terrorist system of hostage taking, beatings, and 
mutilation ensured that the laborers met their state-defined quotas in 
the production of exportable commodities. The shift from slave 
raiding to labor recruitment was here a distinction without a 
difference.”140 By the turn of the century, “mounting reports of 
atrocities” in the Congo led to debates in the British Parliament and 
investigations of conditions in the Congo.141 These debates can be 
seen as an early example of the development of international human 
rights law, which is often enforceable through exposure and public 
pressure. Indeed, by 1908 international pressure forced the King to 
relinquish his private colony to the Belgian government.142
Despite its hypocrisy and the human carnage it helped 
produce,143 the Brussels Act nevertheless marked a major break in 
139. See generally JAMES DUFFY, A QUESTION OF SLAVERY (1967); 
CATHERINE HIGGS, CHOCOLATE ISLANDS: COCOA, SLAVERY, AND COLONIAL AFRICA
(2012) (describing the virtual enslavement of African workers in the production of 
cocoa in West African colonies of Portugal and Great Britain); LOWELL J. SATRE,
CHOCOLATE ON TRIAL: SLAVERY, POLITICS, AND THE ETHICS OF BUSINESS (2005);
IBRAHIM K. SUNDIATA, FROM SLAVING TO NEOSLAVERY: THE BIGHT OF BIAFRA AND 
FERNANDO PO IN THE ERA OF ABOLITION, 1827-1930 (1996); see also Gervase
Clarence-Smith, The Hidden Costs of Labour on the Cocoa Plantations of São Tomé 
and Príncipe, 1875-1914, 6 PORTUGUESE STUD. 152, 152-53 (1990). On the 
continuation of bondage in Africa and elsewhere, see generally MIERS, supra note
120.
140. DRESCHER, supra note 3, at 401.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 400-01. See also Drescher, supra note 47, at 98-99.
143. In addition to the carnage in the Congo and virtual enslavement in the 
cocoa industry, the most shocking atrocities were in German Southwest Africa 
(modern Namibia) where a policy of genocide was a forerunner of both the 
holocaust and of the use of state slavery through incarceration and mass exploitation 
of the local population. See JAN-BART GEWALD, HERERO HEROES: A SOCIO-
POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE HERERO OF NAMIBIA 1890-1923, at 1-9 (1999); DAVID
OLUSOGA & CASPER W. ERICHSEN, THE KAISER’S HOLOCAUST: GERMANY’S
FORGOTTEN GENOCIDE AND THE COLONIAL ROOTS OF NAZISM 1-13 (2010). The 
German government used concentration camps, forced labor including allowing 
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the history of slavery and international law. A substantial European 
component of the international community had now declared that 
slavery and slaving were unacceptable. While once slavery was 
practiced and legal “Beyond the Line” of European laws and legal 
culture, the line had now been moved outward around the globe so 
that slavery could exist legally only beyond the scope of 
international law, hidden away in far corners of Africa, Asia, and the 
Middle East. After World War I, the League of Nations organized 
the Slavery Convention of 1926 with the goal of mobilizing 
international cooperation in rooting out slavery everywhere on the 
planet and the “abolition of slavery in all its forms.”144 Slavery was 
now broadly defined as “the status or condition of a person over 
whom any or all of the powers attaching to the rights of ownership 
are exercised.”145 It further defined the slave trade as 
all acts involved in the capture, acquisition or disposal of a person with 
intent to reduce him to slavery; all acts involved in the acquisition of a 
slave with a view to selling or exchanging him; all acts of disposal by sale 
or exchange of a slave acquired with a view to being sold or exchanged, 
and, in general, every act of trade or transport in slaves.146
The Convention distinguished forced labor from slavery but 
stipulated that “forced labour may only be exacted for public 
purposes” and prohibited “compulsory or forced labour from 
developing into conditions analogous to slavery.”147 Most League of 
Nations members, as well as the United States (which never joined 
the League), signed the 1926 Convention. 
The Convention and the League of Nations had some 
successes, such as pressuring Nepal and Burma to formally end 
slavery.148 But half a decade after it was signed, slavery reemerged in 
the Soviet Union and shortly after that in Nazi Germany. The Soviet 
Gulag would continue for more than three decades, effectively 
enslaving millions of Soviet citizens, prisoners of war, and even 
civilians taken from Axis countries in remote labor camps operated 
private companies to use virtual slave labor, and even conducted medical 
experiments on natives placed in concentration camps.
144. League of Nations Slavery Convention art. 2, Sept. 25, 1926.
145. Id. at art. 1.
146. Id.
147. Id. at art. 5; David Weissbrodt & Anti-Slavery Int’l, Abolishing Slavery 
and Its Contemporary Forms, OFF. U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUM. RTS. 4-5
(2002), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/slaveryen.pdf [https://
perma.cc/335W-TCS5].
148. Weissbrodt & Anti-Slavery Int’l, supra note 147, at 5.
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under legally unaccountable draconian authority.149 Long after World 
War II was over, the Soviet Union replicated the practices of the 
ancient world by holding surviving German POWs as slaves in the 
Gulag.150 Japan likewise enslaved massive numbers of civilians from 
conquered nations, and like Germany and the Soviet Union, 
replicated the ancient practice of turning prisoners of war into slave 
laborers.151 In the case of captured military nurses, Japan turned 
POWs into sex slaves, who, along with some 200,000 civilian 
women from conquered lands, were designated “comfort women.”152
149. Most famously, the Soviets captured the Swedish diplomat Raoul 
Wallenberg from Budapest and brought him to the Gulag, where he eventually died.
See generally PAUL A. LEVINE, RAOUL WALLENBERG IN BUDAPEST: MYTH, HISTORY 
AND HOLOCAUST (2010).
150. Id.; Solveig Grothe, “I Did Nothing Wrong” German Gulag Prisoners 
Recall Their Postwar Ordeal, DER SPIEGEL (Aug. 31, 2010, 5:54 PM),
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/i-did-nothing-wrong-german-gulag-
prisoners-recall-their-postwar-ordeal-a-714947.html [https://perma.cc/CWH9-
PKZR]; Russia: Last WW2 German Prisoner Finally Released from Gulag, WORLD 
NEWS DAILY REP., http://worldnewsdailyreport.com/russia-last-ww2-german-
prisoner-finally-released-from-gulag/ [https://perma.cc/2XHF-FQBY] (last visited 
Jan. 22, 2018).
151. Shannon Tiezzi, Japanese Company Apologizes for Forced Labor 
During World War II, DIPLOMAT (July 21, 2015), http://thediplomat.com/2015/
07/japanese-company-apologizes-for-forced-labor-during-world-war-ii/ [https://
perma.cc/6UDT-QNMV]; Sayuri Umeda, Japan: WWII POW and Forced Labor 
Compensation Cases, LIBR. CONGRESS (2008), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/pow-
compensation/japan.php [https://perma.cc/J45A-ZNZM].
152. Mindy Kotler, The Comfort Women and Japan’s War on Truth, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 14, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/15/opinion/comfort-
women-and-japans-war-on-truth.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/CYK5-8STQ]; 
Stephen Moynihan, Abe Ignores Evidence, Say Australia’s “Comfort Women”, AGE
(Mar. 3, 2007), http://www.theage.com.au/news/world/abe-ignores-evidence-say-
australias-comfort-women/2007/03/02/1172338881441.html [https://perma.cc/
R5H7-6WEQ]; Norimitus Onishi, Japan’s ‘Atonement’ to Former Sex Slaves Stirs 
Anger, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/25/world/
asia/25japan.html [https://perma.cc/ZCW4-X5TP]. For the growing scholarship on 
this issue, see generally GEORGE HICKS, THE COMFORT WOMEN: JAPAN’S BRUTAL 
REGIME OF ENFORCED PROSTITUTION IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR (1997); Shigeru 
Sato, The Japanese Army and Comfort Women in World War II, in SEX, POWER, AND 
SLAVERY 258 (Gwyn Campbell & Elizabeth Elbourne eds., 2014); C. SARAH SOH,
THE COMFORT WOMEN: SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND POSTCOLONIAL MEMORY IN KOREA 
AND JAPAN (2008); YUKI TANAKA, JAPAN’S COMFORT WOMEN: SEXUAL SLAVERY 
AND PROSTITUTION DURING WORLD WAR II AND THE US OCCUPATION (2002); 
YOSHIMI YOSHIAKI, COMFORT WOMEN: SEXUAL SLAVERY IN THE JAPANESE 
MILITARY DURING WORLD WAR II, ASIA PERSPECTIVES (Suzanne O’Brien trans., 
2000) (1995).
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Even more shocking than the Gulag or the enslavement of 
civilians and POWs under the Japanese was the massive enslavement 
of Europeans perpetrated by Germany from 1939 to 1945. Following 
the invasion of Poland in September 1939, Germany embarked on a 
deliberate and explicit program of enslaving the people of Europe. In 
the next five and a half years, approximately twelve million 
foreigners would be forcibly transported to Germany. This figure 
does not include millions of others who were forced to work for the 
government or the military outside the formal boundaries of the 
Reich. Emulating the ancient world, Germany used captured soldiers 
as slave laborers, as well as millions of Jews, Roma, and others who, 
if not simply slaughtered or starved, were literally worked to death as 
laborers.153 The German government was fully aware, and even 
proud, of its rejection of modern prohibitions of slave labor. Heinrich 
Himmler told SS officers in 1942, “If we do not fill our camps with 
slaves—in this room I mean to say things very firmly and . . . 
clearly—with worker slaves, who will build our cities, our villages, 
our farms without regard to any losses?”154 At Nuremburg, German 
officials would be charged with crimes against humanity, including 
enslavement. Fritz Sauckel, Hitler’s plenipotentiary for labor
mobilization who managed the deportation and enslavement of at 
least five million people, was executed in part for this crime. Sauckel 
actually offered as a defense that he had told Hitler that this forced 
labor constituted slavery, in violation of international law.155
As they left the trains, Jews, Roma, and others arriving at 
Auschwitz were “selected” for either labor or virtually immediate 
extermination in gas chambers. This selection was a modern 
industrialized version of the selection of slaves on the African coast. 
European purchasers—usually ship captains and surgeons—would 
examine available slaves to determine who was healthy enough or 
strong enough to survive the extreme rigors of the middle passage 
and then be sold in the Americas at a profit. If the ship’s surgeon 
153. The expendability of Nazi slave labors was similar to the treatment of 
slaves in many of the seventeenth and eighteenth century sugar colonies, were slaves 
were worked to death in a relatively short period of time, because it was cheaper to 
replace them with new slaves from Africa than treat them in ways that would extend 
their lives. 
154. DRESCHER, supra note 3, at 430-31. See also BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ,
LESS THAN SLAVES: JEWISH FORCED LABOR AND THE QUEST FOR COMPENSATION 17-
18 (1979).
155. DRESCHER, supra note 3, at 430-32, 449; Seymour Drescher, European 
Antislavery: From Empires of Slavery to Global Prohibition, in 4 THE CAMBRIDGE 
WORLD HISTORY OF SLAVERY, 373, 393-95 (2017).
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determined that the captives were not good enough to be purchased, 
the surgeon was in effect denying them value as a commodity. The 
slave—if he or she could not be sold elsewhere—underwent what 
might be termed “commercial death.” As such, having suffered 
“commercial death,” their African owners often killed them on the 
spot.156 At Auschwitz and other Nazi death camps, the history of 
slavery had come full circle from the shores of Africa to modern 
Germany. Slavery was once again legal under municipal law, even as 
the world had forbidden it, made it a crime against humanity, the 
twentieth century equivalent of historical piracy. In the mid-1940s 
there would be as many people enslaved inside Germany as there had 
been enslaved in all of the Americas at the highpoint of slavery in the 
nineteenth century. Even more—millions more—were enslaved and 
being worked to death outside of Germany, under the watchful eye 
of German soldiers and government officials.157 It was all “legal” 
under the municipal law of the regime.
Following the war, the World community once again 
condemned slavery. In 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights began with multiple condemnations of slavery, which 
incorporated the evolving legal rules of the previous two centuries.
Article I summarized nearly two centuries of antislavery thought: 
“All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. 
They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act 
towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”158 This provision 
mirrored the clause in the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 that 
ended slavery there: “All men are born free and equal, and have 
certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may 
be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and 
liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in 
fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness.”159 By 
1783, the Massachusetts courts had used that clause to end slavery in 
the state, making Massachusetts the first slaveholding jurisdiction in 
the western world to do so. Articles I and IV of the UN Declaration 
also tracked the French Declaration of the Rights of Man (1789), 
156. Jeremy Krikler, A Chain of Murder in the Slave Trade: A Wider Context 
of the Zong Massacre, 57 INT’L REV. SOC. HIST. 393, 397 (2012).
157. DANIEL JOHAN GOLDHAGEN, HITLER’S WILLING EXECUTIONERS:
ORDINARY GERMANS AND THE HOLOCAUST 173-74, 456 (1996).
158. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10,
1948).
159. MASS. CONST. art. I, annulled and amended by MASS. CONST. art. CVI. 
On the end of slavery in Massachusetts, see FINKELMAN, supra note 110, at 20-45.
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which stated that “[m]en are born and remain free and equal in 
rights,” and 
[l]iberty consists in the freedom to do everything which injures no one 
else; hence the exercise of the natural rights of each man has no limits 
except those which assure to the other members of the society the 
enjoyment of the same rights. These limits can only be determined by 
law.160
After Article 1 the 1948 Declaration continued to reaffirm an 
end to slavery. Article 2 declares that “[e]veryone is entitled to all 
the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without 
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or 
other status.”161 (This clause also bound all signatories to implement 
this provision, which of course never fully happened). Reflecting the 
Declaration of Independence and the French Declaration of the 
Rights of Man, Article III asserted that “[e]veryone has the right to 
life, liberty and . . . security of person.”162 The Fourth Article offered 
the crescendo of the world community’s views of slavery, five 
centuries after the first Europeans went to Africa and came back with 
slaves: “No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the 
slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.”163
In the next half century, international pressure, diplomacy, and 
the moral force of the world community was brought against those 
places where slavery legally still existed in 1948. For example, “[a]s 
late as 1960, Lord Shackleton reported to the House of Lords that 
African Muslims on pilgrimages to Mecca . . . sold slaves upon 
arrival, ‘using them as living traveller’s cheques.’”164 Indeed, slavery 
remained legal in Saudi Arabia until 1962. And as recently as 1993, 
an Islamic scholar in Iraq defended slavery based on “capture and 
birth.”165 In 2013, Mauritania, by then the last nation to allow 
slavery, finally made slaveholding a crime. However, enforcement 
has hardly been complete. Some forms of bondage remained, 
160. Declaration of the Rights of Man, Aug. 26, 1789, Fr., 
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especially in remote and rural regions in parts of Asia, Africa, and 
the Middle East. Some organizations suggest that five percent of the 
population of North Korea is “enslaved” in some fashion, although 
slavery is formally illegally there.166 But, after 2013, slavery had at 
least been formally abolished everywhere. 
IX. NEW MODERN WORLD: THE FUTURE AND THE FUTURE PAST
The legal vampire of slavery had finally been killed, by the 
“stakes” of laws, treaties, proclamations, court decisions, the 
precedents of Nuremberg, and international declarations driven 
through its heart. The vampire of human culture that had caused so 
much misery, death, and pain, which had always been protected by 
laws, statutes, precedents, and custom, was at last formally dead.
Despite the publicly proclaimed universal formal consensus 
that slavery is a criminal violation of human rights, in parts of Asia 
and Africa slavery is still practiced. In other parts of the world, 
prison labor conditions resemble slavery, especially where the 
criminal justice system is used to “manufacture” labor by selling or 
renting prisoners or in other ways using them for economic gain by 
either the state or individuals. In addition, human trafficking abounds 
throughout the world. While not slavery—in the sense that it is 
neither systematic nor supported by any formal or informal 
government institutions—this sort of labor exploitation has an eerie 
resemblance to some aspects slavery. The treatment of trafficked 
persons often rivals (or exceeds) the brutality of past oppressive 
exploitation of slaves. Evidence currently abounds of being able to 
purchase people in Haiti, some parts of Latin America, parts of 
Africa, the Indian Subcontinent, and Southeast Asia. In West Africa, 
Boko Haram is openly engaged in capturing and selling people as 
slaves.167 None of these contemporary practices are sanctioned by 
law, although some have support from local custom.168 They are 
166. Reuters, supra note 49; Sutter, supra note 49. 
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examples of enslavement but not of slavery. All of these forms of 
bondage happen outside the law, in violation of the law. They are all 
illegal, not only under international law, but at least formally under 
the laws of the countries where they take place. Slavery has finally 
become, under international law, what the U.S. Congress called it in 
1820: a form of piracy with no legal legitimacy or protection. 
Or has it? Has the Vampire risen from his coffin, to once again 
stalk vulnerable human beings under the guise of legalized slavery?
The advent of the Islamic State (ISIL or ISIS) tragically shows 
the resilience of slavery as a system, protected by law, endorsed by a 
government, albeit a pariah revolutionary government of a self-
proclaimed state, and justified by the law of man and the law of God. 
It is clear that “the vast majority of Muslim scholars today, like their 
counterparts in Judaism and Christianity, roundly reject slavery.”169
Nearly two decades ago a scholar of Islamic law, Bernard Freamon, 
argued that “the abolition of slavery is not and has never been an 
impossibility in Islamic jurisprudence,”170 and that “the time has 
come for the formal recognition of the consensus that slavery is 
unacceptable to Muslims and that it has been juridically 
abolished.”171 But it is also clear that “[i]n modern times . . . literal 
interpreters of Islamic dogma and law continue[] to support the 
practice [of slavery] as divinely sanctioned.”172
The Islamic State is now drawing on this tradition, making 
scripturally based arguments in favor of slavery. In essence, the 
Islamic State (within the boundaries of its jurisdiction) has once 
again made slavery, and the enslavement of free people, legal and 
open, at least in one place in the world.
In openly endorsing the enslavement of non-Muslims, the 
Islamic State published its own legal code to both justify slavery and 
to regulate it. As Kenneth Ross, the executive director of Human 
Rights Watch, noted, this document “sets forth an interpretation of
sharia, or Islamic law, albeit an extreme one.”173 The ISIS document 
169. Usaama al-Azami, ISIS, Slavery, and Islamic Abolitionism,
HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/usaama-alazami/isis-slavery-
and-islamic-abolitionism_b_8050606.html [https://perma.cc/52LK-6FDM] (last 
visited Jan. 22, 2018).
170. Freamon, supra note 167, at 6.
171. Id. at 7-8.
172. TOLEDANO, supra note 69, at 484.
173. Kenneth Roth, Slavery: The ISIS Rules, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Sept. 25, 
2015, 10:15 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/09/05/slavery-isis-rules 
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asserts that “[i]t is permissible to have sexual intercourse with the 
female captive. Allah the almighty said: ‘[Successful are the 
believers] who guard their chastity, except from their wives or (the 
captives and slaves) that their right hands possess, for then they are 
free from blame [Koran 23:5–6].’”174 ISIS explains that “[i]t is 
permissible to buy, sell, or give as a gift female captives and slaves, 
for they are merely property, which can be disposed of as long as 
that doesn’t cause [the Muslim ummah][,] [or community of faith][,] 
any harm or damage” and at the death of their owner, “female 
captives are distributed as part of his estate.”175 As with any system 
of slavery, the ISIS rules also legitimize the punishment of slaves. “It 
is permissible to beat the female slave as a [form of] darb ta’deeb 
[disciplinary beating], [but] it is forbidden to [use] darb al-takseer 
[literally, breaking beating], [darb] al-tashaffi [beating for the 
purpose of achieving gratification], or [darb] al-ta’dheeb [torture 
beating]. Further, it is forbidden to hit the face.”176
And so, in our own time, the vampire of legalized slavery, 
protected and even venerated, has once again walked on the earth, 
brazenly, openly, and in full view of the world to see.177 In the land 
where Babylonian and Assyrian slave owners and slaves left records 
of human bondage four millennia ago, new laws and new records of 
slaveholding have emerged. The Vampire is back; the question is, 
will it ever finally die? 
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